THE NEGLECTED QUESTION OF
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF EPA:
QUIS CUSTODIET IPSOS CUSTODES (WHO
SHALL WATCH THE WATCHERS
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I
INTRODUCTION

The United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and the
federal environmental protection laws within its charge have received much
attention in the literature during the past twenty years. Commentators have
frequently considered the relationship of EPA to the courts, including the
advantages and disadvantages of both more and less exacting judicial review
of agency decisions.' Scholars have likewise periodically examined the
peculiar way in which Congress has drafted the federal environmental
protection laws to ensure their achievement of policy goals. 2 These laws have
Copyright © 1991 by Law and Contemporary Problems
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In my plenary review of EPA's first twenty years, reproduced later in this volume, I describe more
fully the collision of institutional forces (including those unleashed by Congress) that have
surrounded EPA, why they developed, and how they have affected both EPA and the evolution of
federal environmental law. See RichardJ. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal
EnvironmentalLaw, 54 L & Contemp Probs 311 (Autumn 1991). This article explores in greater depth
the causes and effects of congressional oversight of EPA, a specific topic for discussion at the
Symposium on EPA sponsored by the Duke University and Washington University Schools of Law in
November 1990. The article benefitted greatly from the comments I received at the symposium,
especially those offered by Joel Aberbach, Don Elliott, Anne Shields, and Steve Shimberg. Kathleen
Lindenberger and Cathy Varley provided valuable research assistance.
1. See, for example, R. Shep Melnick, Regulation and the Courts: The Case of the Clean Air Act
(Brookings lnst, 1983); James Oakes, The Judicial Role in Environmental Law, 52 NYU L Rev 498
(1977); Richard Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw in Judicial Review
of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 62 Iowa L Rev 713 (1977); Harold
Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmakingand the Role of the Courts, 122 U Pa L Rev 509 (1974); see also
Clayton Gillette &James Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U Pa L Rev 1027 (1990); Cass Sunstein,
On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressivejudicial Review of Agen O , Action, 1989 Duke LJ 522.
2. William Rodgers, Lesson of the Owl and the Crows: The Role of Deception in the Evolution of
Environmental Statutes, 4 J Land Use & Envir L 377 (1989); Richard Stewart & Bruce Ackerman,
Reforming Environmental Lcw: The Democratic Casefor Market Incentives, 13 Colum J Envir L I (1988);
Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and "Fine
Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 Stan L Rev 1267 (1985); E. Donald Elliott, Bruce Ackerman & John
Millian, Toward A Theor, of Statutory Evolution: The Federalizationof Environmental Law, IJ L Econ & Org
313 (1985); David Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Act, 30 UCLA L
Rev 740 (1983).
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typically regulated EPA in the first instance by mandating that it achieve
ambitious environmental quality objectives within relatively short periods of
time. 3 Commentators have also noted how, following EPA's repeated failures
to accomplish initial statutory mandates, Congress has amended those federal
laws to make them even more prescriptive in their commands to EPA. 4
Finally, in recent years, valuable scholarship has addressed the propriety and
efficacy of EPA's oversight by other executive branch agencies, especially the
5
Office of Management and Budget ("OMB").
One significant aspect of EPA's institutional experience has, however,
been largely overlooked in legal scholarship. Commentators have mistakenly
defined EPA's relationship with Congress almost exclusively in terms of the
statutory provisions that Congress has passed and placed within EPA's
jurisdiction. Those laws, however, are just the more prominent strands in a
detailed web of congressional efforts to oversee EPA's work that has
profoundly affected the agency and the development of federal environmental
protection policy.

The amount and character of congressional oversight of EPA are both
remarkable. Congress appears to engage in more intense and pervasive
oversight of EPA than it does of other agencies. In addition, the character of
congressional oversight of EPA appears to be consistently adversarial and
negative. There are many reasons for these phenomena. Some relate to
changes that occurred in Congress during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s that
are wholly unrelated to EPA and its mandate. Others, however, may stem
from the kinds of challenges brought to bear upon our governmental
institutions by environmental protection issues. Although the net
disadvantages of oversight are not likely to be greater than the corresponding
net advantages, they are substantial enough to warrant significant reform of
congressional practices.
This article describes the extent and character of congressional oversight
of EPA, explains why that oversight has been so intense and adversarial,
assesses its impact on EPA, and suggests possible congressional reforms to
remedy oversight's adverse effects.
3. John Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 Ecol L Q233 (1990); Schoenbrod, 30
UCLA L Rev 740 (cited in note 2).
4. See, for example, Sydney Shapiro & Robert Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the
Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 Duke LJ 819;J. William Futrell, Hazardous Wastes and Toxic
Substances: Lessons from Superfund, RCRA, and Other Environmental Laws, 24 Houston L Rev 125 (1987);
James Florio, Congress as Reluctant Regulator Hazardous Waste Policy in the 1980s, 3 Yale J Reg 351
(1986).
5. See, for example, V. Kerry Smith, Environmental Policymaking under Executive Order 12291: An
Introduction, in V. Kerry Smith, ed, Environmental Policymaking under Reagan's Executive Order (U North
Carolina Press, 1985); Erik Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management and Budget Supervision of
Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking under Executive Order 12291, 4 VaJ Nat Res L I (1984); see
also PresidentialManagement of Rulemaking in Regulatory Agencies (Natl Acad Pub Admin, 1987) ("NAPA,
Presidential Management"); Christopher DeMuth & Douglas Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency
Rulemaking, 99 Harv L Rev 1075 (1986); Alan Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The
Wl'rong hay to Write a Regulation, 99 Harv L Rev 1059 (1986).
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EXTENT OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF

A.

EPA

Origins of Congressional Oversight

Legislative oversight of executive agencies is a relatively modern
phenomenon in the United States. Historically, "legislative suspicion and
reluctance were reflected in the detailed character of statutory law." 6 Federal
jurisdiction touched on only a few discrete areas, which allowed congressional
committees to develop the expertise necessary "to control the particulars of
administration and policy" through detailed statutory provisions. 7 The
federal bureaucracy was not especially large and was mostly ministerial in
its duties. The need for congressional oversight of administrative
implementation therefore appeared slight.
Ironically, as congressional authority expanded in the late nineteenth
century, Congress's domination of federal policymaking was threatened.
Congress could no longer, it seemed, dictate the details of government. The
New Deal legislation of the 1930s and 1940s left no doubt on that score.
Federal bureaucracies became large; broad statutory delegations required
agencies to decide between competing interests based on their own political
value judgments; 8 and Congress became more susceptible to the criticism that
it was failing to ensure against federal agencies' abdicating their statutory
responsibilities. It was in the wake of such criticism that Congress passed the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, which formally directed congressional
committees to oversee executive branch implementation of federal laws. 9
The 1946 law conferred on each standing committee the responsibility to
"exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative
agencies concerned of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the
jurisdiction of such committee."' 0 The new law also sought to strengthen the
committee system generally by reducing the number of committees and
clarifying their jurisdictional bounds. When a discernible increase in
oversight did not result, oversight became known as Congress's "neglected"
function. '
6. Arthur MacMahon, Congressional Oversight of Administration: The Power of the Purse, in Theodore
Lowi, ed, Legislative Politics U.S.A. 186 (Little, Brown, 2d ed 1965).
7. Joel Aberbach, Keeping a JWatchful Eye: The Politics of Congressional Oversight 20 (Brookings Inst,
1990) ("Watchful Eye"); see also Jeremy Rabkin, Micromanaging the Administrative Agencies, 100 Pub
Interest 116, 117-18 (1990).
8. Senate Committee on Government Operations, 2 Study on Federal Regulation: Congressional
Oversight of Regulatory Agencies 6 (1977) ("Senate Study on Federal Regulation").
9. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 ch 753, 60 Stat 832 (1946), codified at 2 USC
§ 190(e) (1982); Congressional Oversight of Regulatory Agencies: The Need to Strike a Balance and Focus on
Performance 15 (Natl Acad Pub Admin, 1988) ("NAPA, Oversight Study").
10. 60 Stat 832 (cited in note 9); see generally Morris Ogul, Congressional Oversight: Structures and
Incentives, in Lawrence Dodd & Bruce Oppenheimer, eds, Congress Reconsidered 318 (Cong QPress, 2d
ed 1981).
11. See Aberbach, Watchful Eye at 25-34 (cited in note 7); NAPA, Oversight Study at 15 (cited in
note 9).
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In 1970, the year of EPA's creation, Congress renewed its effort to
improve and expand oversight of the executive branch. Congress authorized
the hiring of additional committee staff, empowered the General Accounting
Office ("GAO") to evaluate agency statutory implementation, and required
most committees to issue regular reports on their oversight activities.' 2 A few
years later, in response to a House report concluding that oversight remained
inadequate, the House further sought to encourage oversight through several
rule changes. Under these reforms, the House assigned special oversight
responsibilities to its Government Operations Committee, granted oversight
powers to other committees, and generally encouraged House committees to
3
establish oversight subcommittees.'
Although a perception remained during the 1970s that Congress
continued to neglect its oversight responsibilities (largely because individual
members lacked sufficient incentive to make oversight a priority),' 4 oversight
dramatically increased during that time. Between 1968 and 1976, the number
of oversight hearings per Congress quadrupled in the House and doubled in
the Senate.' 5 Further, the number of days of hearings and meetings
congressional committees devoted to oversight rose from 187 days in 1971 to
587 days in 1983.16 As a percentage of total days of congressional committee
hearings and meetings, oversight was 9.1 percent of the total in 1971 and 25.2
percent in 1983.17
B.

The Structure of Congressional Oversight

In its most standard form, congressional oversight occurs when a
committee holds a public hearing on an agency's implementation of a federal
program within the committee's jurisdiction. High ranking agency officials
testify at the hearing, as do other interested parties whose representatives
express the same or conflicting views on the issues raised. Other witnesses
typically include neutral "experts," who describe the results of their studies of
the agency's work, and ordinary citizens, who describe the impact of the
agency's programs on their lives.
12. In the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, Congress also substituted "review and study"
for "continuous watchfulness" in its 1946 definition of congressional oversight responsibility. Pub L
No 91-510, 84 Stat 1156 (1970). Each standing committee of the House and Senate is instructed to
"review and study, on a continuing basis, the application, administration, and execution of those
laws, or parts of laws the subject of which is within jurisdiction of that committee." Id; see generally
Morris Ogul, Congress Oversees the Bureaucracy: Studies in Legislative Supervision 189 (U Pittsburgh Press,
1976).
13. Aberbach, Watchful Eye at 27-28 (cited in note 7); NAPA, Oversight Study at 16-17 (cited in
note 9).
14. Aberbach, Watchful Eye at 30-31 (cited in note 7); NAPA, Oversight Study at 17 (cited in note

9).
15. John Chubb, Interest Groups and the Bureaucracy 47 (Stanford U Press, 1983).
16. Aberbach, Watchful Eye at 35 (cited in note 7).
17. Id. Former Attorney General Griffin Bell recently speculated that the "oversight function in
Congress ... probably occupies more than 50 percent of Congress' time." Comments of Griffin Bell,
Panel on Congressional Control of the Administration of Government: Hearings, Investigations, Oversight, and
Legislative History, in Symposium on the Presidency and Congress: Constitutionally Separated and Shared Powers,
68 Wash U L Q 595, 595 (1990).
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Congress, however, also conducts effective agency oversight through other
less formal and less public techniques. The committees hold their own
informal meetings to discuss the relevant agencies. They frequently request
the assistance of various investigative arms of Congress, including the
Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, Office of
Technology Assessment, GAO, and Congressional Budget Office, which are
authorized to prepare reports on aspects of the agencies' operations.' 8 These
reports may form the basis of subsequent formal hearings.
Finally, the most frequently used oversight technique is also the most
informal. While the members of Congress themselves sometimes telephone
or meet with agency heads, the more pervasive practice is for committee staff
to communicate with high ranking agency staff.' 9 These informal contacts can
be very useful for information gathering and for influencing agency policy.
Invariably, multiple committees have authority to oversee each agency's
operations. 20 These committees include the appropriations committee with
jurisdiction over the agency's budget; any authorization committee (or
committees) with jurisdiction to initiate legislation pertaining to the agency's
program; and the government operations committee in each chamber 2' with
general jurisdiction to review the effectiveness and quality of the operations of
the federal government. 2 2 Within each committee, there may also be more
than one subcommittee that can claim oversight authority. In the House, for
instance, most committees have a subcommittee on oversight, which
possesses independent authority (but not to the exclusion of that otherwise
possessed by other subcommittees) to oversee activities within the standing
23
committee's jurisdiction.
Congressional oversight can be triggered in a variety of ways. Congress
itself can supply the trigger. For instance, Congress often includes in its
enactments a requirement that an agency report to Congress on a particular
topic. Oversight hearings and meetings are also frequently initiated in
response to an apparent scandal or policy crisis. 24 The committee staff may
itself discover the problem; in many cases, however, the national news media,
or a disgruntled constituent, interest group, or agency employee first brings
18. Bernard Rosen, Holding Government BureaucraciesAccountable 75-77 (Praeger, 2d ed 1989);
Lawrence Dodd & Richard Schott, Congress and the Administrative State 248-62 (Wiley, 1979). For
instance, during the 1987 fiscal year, GAO issued 672 reports to Congress, 95 reports to agencies,
and testified 161 times before Congress. NAPA, Oversight Study at 10-11 (cited in note 9).
19. Aberbach, Watchful Eye at 130-34 (cited in note 7).
20. See note 34 and accompanying text.
21. The formal name of the committee in the House is the "Committee on Government
Operations"; in the Senate, it is named the "Committee on Governmental Affairs."
22. See Dodd & Schott, Congress and the Administrative State at 165-68 (cited in note 18); Rosen,
Holding Government BureaucraciesAccountable at 69-71 (cited in note 18).
23. NAPA, Oversight Study at 11-12 (cited in note 9).
24. Both members of Congress and their staff listed malfeasance (scandal) and policy crisis as
the two most important factors triggering oversight. Aberbach, 1I'atchful Eye at 111-14 (cited in note
7). They listed the reauthorization process as the next most important. Id. They also listed publicity
potential as one of the least important factors, id, which arguably casts some doubt on the veracity of
the responses.
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it to the committee's attention. 25 Committee staff commonly establish
a network of contacts in the agency to learn about internal agency
26
controversy.
Oversight also occurs during the course of a committee's consideration of
new legislation or its reauthorization of an existing statute. Annual budget
hearings provide another opportunity for individual members of Congress to
question an agency's existing practices, 27 as do confirmation hearings held by
the standing Senate committee responsible for reviewing presidential
2
nominations for high-level agency appointments. 8
Finally, the use of inspectors general within each agency is a relatively new
phenomena and has the potential for triggering even more congressional
oversight. 29 Inspectors general of agencies such as EPA are appointed by the
president and possess sweeping oversight authority, extending to virtually all
aspects of the agency's work. 30 While these inspectors are subject to removal
by the president, the head of the agency is expressly barred from preventing
that agency's inspector general from performing his or her work, 3 ' and, in
removing an inspector, the president must communicate to Congress "the
reasons for any such removal." 32 Finally, the Inspector General Act of 1978
promotes congressional oversight by providing for notification of an inspector
general's findings to the appropriate congressional committees and
subcommittees. 3
C.

Congressional Oversight of EPA

Whatever the accuracy of the view that Congress has historically shirked
most of its responsibilities to oversee agencies, no such neglect is evident in
the case of congressional oversight of EPA. As described above, EPA came
25. Id at 86-90.
26. Id at 90-93.
27. Rosen, Holding Government BureaucraciesAccountable at 62-64 (cited in note 18); Senate Study on
Federal Regulation at 42 (cited in note 8) (appropriations process described as "most potent form of
Congressional oversight").
28. Rosen, Holding Government Bureaucracies Accountable at 71-75 (cited in note 18); NAPA,
Oversight Study at 12 (cited in note 9).
29. Pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (substantially in 1988), there are
presidentially appointed inspectors general within each federal "establishment," which includes all
the cabinet agencies and other agencies such as EPA, and administratively appointed inspectors
general for each designated federal "entity," including organizations such as ACTION and the
Federal Reserve System. See 5 USC App §§ 8E(a)(2) (App 3), 11(2); see generally HR No 100-771,
100th Cong, 2d Sess (1988); HR No 100-1020, 100th Cong, 2d Sess (1988); Margaret Gates &
Marjorie Knowles, The Inspector GeneralAct in the FederalGovernment: A New Approach to Accountabilitv, 36
Ala L Rev 473 (1985).
30. 5 USC App § 4(a).
31. Id at § 3(a).
32. Id at § 5(b).
33. Id at §§ 5(b), (d). The inspectors general themselves are also not immune from
congressional oversight. See Martin Tolchin, Senators Accuse Inspectors of "Pattern of Wrongdoing, " NY
Times A26 col I (Sept 8, 1990) (Senate investigators reported a "disturbing pattern of wrongdoing"
by inspectors general.); Allan Gold, E.P.A. Office Faces Inquir in House, NY Times A37 col 1 (Dec 9,
1989) (House subcommittee inquiry into whether EPA inspector general engaged in "questionable
investigative practices" when considering charges of misconduct by EPA Administrator).
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into existence just as Congress sought to use its oversight authority to strike a
new balance of power between the executive and legislative branches. The
result has been a persistent struggle between the two branches for control of
EPA.
Indeed, because EPA's jurisdiction has affected so many interest groups,
the demand for the agency's oversight has grown exponentially among the
committees and subcommittees in Congress, as has the number of oversight
hearings regarding the agency's work. Most committees can find a nexus
between their assigned jurisdiction and an aspect of EPA's work. At present,
at least eleven standing House and nine standing Senate committees and up
to 100 of their subcommittees share jurisdiction over EPA.3 4 Those
committees utilize the full panoply of oversight tools in supervising EPA's

work.
Congressional supervision of EPA each year includes lengthy and rigorous
appropriations hearings on the agency's budget, 3 5 numerous appearances by
EPA officials at hearings, 36 between 100 and 150 congressionally commanded
EPA reports to Congress,3 7 approximately 5,000 congressional inquiries to
the agency, and doubtless even more frequent, less formal agency contacts. It
also includes as many as forty GAO reports to Congress about EPA and its
programs, 38 and, when presidential appointments are made to the agency,
confirmation hearings on those nominations. Finally, the Office of the
Inspector General at the EPA (which was created in 1978) has played an active
oversight function within the agency; EPA inspector generals' reports have
34. William Reilly, The Turning Point: An Environmental Vision for the 1990s, 9 (Nov 27, 1989)
(address by EPA administrator to the Natural Resources Defense Council) (copy on file with the
author); see Department of the Environment Act of 1990, S Rep No 101-262, 101st Cong, 2d Sess 27
(1990) (EPA overseen by 34 Senate and 56 House committees). The number of committees and
subcommittees is, however, somewhat misleading. The degree of fragmentation appears less
pronounced, for instance, if one considers just the standing committees that have jurisdiction over
specific laws within EPA's jurisdiction. On the Senate side, the vast majority are within the
jurisdiction of the Senate Committee on the Environment and Public Works; other standing
committees include: Commerce and Science; Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry; Energy and
Natural Resources; and Commerce, Science, and Transportation. On the House side, there is
significantly more fragmentation, as the laws are more evenly split between the Committees on
Energy and Commerce; Public Works and Transportation; Merchant Marine; Science and
Technology; Agriculture; and Interior and Insular Affairs. Of course, these listings do not include
the government operations or appropriations committees in either chamber, both of which exercise
considerable oversight authority.
35. See text accompanying notes 66-73.
36. See text accompanying notes 40-45.
37. Id; see Thomas Adams & M. Elizabeth Cox, The Environmental Shell Game and the Need for
Codification, 20 Envir L Rptr 10367 (Sept 1990).
38. My own survey of GAO annual indices of reports during the last decade showed the
following number of reports on EPA programs each year: 1980 (28); 1981 (18); 1982 (40); 1983
(26); and 1984 (27); 1985 (12); 1986 (26); 1987 (21); 1988 (26); and 1989 (17). There were far fewer
reports on EPA during the first decade of EPA's existence. It is also not surprising that the largest
number of reports occurred during 1982, which was the only full year that Anne Gorsuch served as
EPA administrator. The number of reports on EPA compared to the total number of GAO reports in
any one year does not appear to be relatively high. In fiscal year 1987, when GAO issued somewhere
between 21 and 26 reports on EPA, GAO issued 767 reports in all. See NAPA, Oversight Stud)' at 10
(cited in note 9).
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frequently triggered, or otherwise been the subject of, formal congressional
39
oversight.
Perhaps most remarkable is the number of times EPA officials testify
before Congress. 40 From 1971 to 1988, EPA officials appeared before each
Congress between ninety-two and 214 times, testifying on 142 occasions in
the first session of the 101st Congress alone. 4 ' Other federal agencies have
appeared far less often. According to a Senate study, during the 93rd and
94th Congresses, EPA appeared 208 times, 4 2 while, for example, the Federal
Trade Commission appeared 114 times and the National Labor Relations
Board only thirteen times. 43 Even the Defense Department has appeared less
often than EPA in some sessions of Congress. 44 The National Academy of
39. Oversight of the Environmental Protection Agency's Enforcement Program, Hearings
before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, 101st Cong, 1st Sess 23-29 (1989)
(testimony ofJohn Martin, EPA inspector general); Contracting at Environmental Protection Agency
and Its Effect on Federal Employees, Hearings before the House Committee on Post Office and Civil
Service, 101st Cong, 1st Sess 27-60 (testimony of John Martin, EPA inspector general); EPA's
Implementation of Laws Regulating Asbestos Hazards in School and in the Air, Hearings before the
House Committee on Govt Operations, 100th Cong, 2d Sess 3-40 (1988) (testimony of Donald
Kirkendall, EPA deputy inspector general); International Export of U.S. Waste, Hearings before the
House Committee on Govt Operations, 100th Cong, 2d Sess 12-34 (testimony ofJohn Martin, EPA
inspector general).
40. Of course, not every appearance by an EPA official before Congress inevitably involves
congressional oversight of an EPA program. Itnonetheless provides a readily available and at least
roughly accurate measure of the relative degree of such oversight.
41. EPA officials testified 92 times during the 92nd Congress (1971-72), 113 during the 93rd
(1973-74), 127 during the 94th (1975-76), 172 during the 95th (1977-78), 212 during the 96th
(1979-80), 182 during the 97th (1981-82), 148 during the 98th (1983-84), 145 during the 99th
(1985-86), and 214 during the 100th (1987-88). Frequency of testimony per congressional session is
outlined in Table 1. These statistics are derived from those prepared by EPA's Office of Legislation,
Legislative Division, which has compiled formal statistics on the number of times EPA officials have
testified before Congress for 1971-78 (by Congress) and for 1984-87 (by session of Congress), and a
computer search of the Congressional Index Service for the remaining years, which provides for a
less precise, but approximate number. The relatively low number of hearings at which EPA officials
appear to have testified in 1982 is surprising given that 1982 was both the only full year of
Administrator Gorsuch's tenure and a highly controversial year. It also contrasts with the
exceedingly high number of GAO reports on EPA that same year (see note 38). Finally, my
computation for 1979 (115) differs from that suggested by Administrator Costle in 1980 when he
testified before Congress that EPA officials testified in 1979 more than 200 times before 40
congressional committees and subcommittees. Department of Housing and Urban DevelopmentIndependent Agencies Appropriations for 1981, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House
Committee on Appropriations, 96th Cong, 2d Sess 4 (1980) (testimony of EPA Administrator
Douglas Costle); see also Dodd & Schott, Congress and the Administrative State at 263-64 (cited in note
18).
42. That number is somewhat less than that provided to me by EPA for those same Congresses.
See numbers recited in note 41.
43. Senate Study on Federal Regulation at 81 (cited in note 8). The Civil Aeronautics Board
appeared 55 times, Consumer Product Safety Commission 25, Federal Power Commission 90,
Federal Trade Commission 114, Food and Drug Administration 80, Interstate Commerce
Commission 70, National Labor Relations Board 13, Nuclear Regulatory Commission 21,
Occupational Safety and Health Administration 20, and Securities and Exchange Commission 65.
See also NAPA, Oversight Study at 32 (cited in note 9) (FTC and SEC appear at far fewer oversight
hearings than EPA).
44. In 1984, which was one of EPA's lowest years, Defense Department officials testified in
approximately 45 hearings, compared to 58 for EPA. The number of standing committees and
subcommittees with jurisdiction over the Defense Department (107) appears to be slightly greater
than that for EPA. L. Gordon Crovitz, The Presidenc , and Congress: Constitutionally Separated and Shared
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Public Administration recently studied the degree of congressional oversight
of EPA and other federal agencies and concluded: "EPA is in a unique
situation, given the pervasiveness of environmental hazards and the large
45
number of committees with jurisdiction over the agency."
To be sure, EPA's appearances are not evenly divided between these
committees. There are standing committees and certain of their
subcommittees before which EPA officials testify much more frequently. This
fact is apparent from a breakdown of the standing committees before which
EPA testified during 1984-86, provided in Table 1. The degree of
fragmentation in the House, however, is markedly greater than in the Senate.
TABLE

EPA

1
(1984-86)46

APPEARANCES BEFORE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-rEES

House Committees
Agriculture
Appropriations
Armed Services
District of Columbia
Energy and Commerce
Foreign Affairs
Government Operations
Interior and Insular Affairs
Judiciary
Merchant and Marine Fisheries
Post Office and Civil Service
Public Works and Transportation
Science and Technology
Small Business
Ways and Means
Budget Task Force
Northeast Midwest Cong Coalition
Senate Committees
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry
Appropriations
Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Energy and Natural Resources
Environment and Public Works
Finance
Governmental Affairs
Judiciary
Small Business
TOTAL
Note: These numbers represent congressional hearings
formal statement.

1984
1
1
I
1
10
4
2
1
3
1
9
4
1
1

1985
1
1
1
15
1
2
1
5
4
10
2
2

1986
2
1
12
1
7
3
1
1
6
4
I

I
1
2
2
10
1

1
24

1
I
3
11
I
1

2
1
3
1
59
75
58
at which EPA was requested to present a

Powers, 68 Wash U L Q 598, 600 (1990). The Defense Department also receives far more official
written congressional inquiries per year (100,000) than does EPA. Id.
45. NAPA, Oversight Study at 30 (cited in note 9). NAPA also referred to the "lack of consensus
over priorities" in environmental protection policy, "the great costs that [environmental laws]
impose on regulated industries," and "uncertainty about their consequences" as additional features
contributing to the large amount of congressional oversight of EPA. Id.
46. Id at 22. The total columns reflect the correction of apparent computational errors in the
source document. (The total columns in the source document read 56, 79, and 63.)

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 54: No. 4

The significance of Congress's oversight of EPA is not confined to its
intensity; it has also been remarkably and consistently negative. EPA bashing
has been commonplace on Capitol Hill as the agency has become "every
47
elected official's favorite whipping boy."

The congressional practice of condemning EPA finds its roots in
congressional oversight predating EPA's creation. Senator Edmund Muskie's
Air and Water Pollution Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Public
Works was strongly critical of one of EPA's predecessor agencies, 48 the
National Air Pollution Control Administration, as was Representative Paul
Rogers's Subcommittee on Public Health and Welfare of the House
Committee on Interstate Commerce. 49 After EPA was created, Senator
Muskie's subcommittee quickly staked out its position as the agency's critical
overseer. Muskie and others sharply criticized agency officials in widely
publicized hearings in the early 1970s. 50 The legislators strongly counseled
the officials about the importance of consulting with the subcommittee prior
to making important agency decisions. 5' They also were sharply critical of
any indication that either the White House or OMB was having undue
52
influence on the agency's implementation and enforcement of the laws.
Such critical practice became the hallmark of Muskie's subcommittee but
did not remain confined there, or even to the Senate. It spread to both
chambers and has persisted over the last twenty years. Representatives John
The table does not reflect the degree of fragmentation occurring within the subcommittees of the
standing committees. The total number of EPA appearances reflected in this table also differs
slightly from my own tabulations for those same years. See note 41. The number of standing House
committees before which EPA appeared during those years (15) is also greater than the number of
standing House committees thought to have jurisdiction over EPA (11). The most probable
explanation is that those appearances were not all based on the committee's jurisdiction over EPA's
programs, but were instead simply informational in character.
47. Melnick, Regulation and the Courts at 322 (cited in note 1);see Department of Housing and
Urban Development-Independent Agencies Appropriations for 1987, Hearings before the
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 99th Cong, 2d Sess 161 (1986)
(testimony of Administrator Lee Thomas) ("Everybody is accountable and nobody is accountable
under the way [Congress] is setting it up, but they have got a designated whipping boy."); William D.
Ruckelshaus, EPA, 16 EPAJ 14, 15 (Jan/Feb 1990).
48. The Committee on Public Works created the Air and Water Pollution Subcommittee in 1963
and named Senator Muskie as its first chair. See History of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public
Works, S Doc No 100-45, 100th Cong, 2d Sess 10 (Dec 1988).
49. See Charles Jones, Clean Air: The Policies and Politics of Pollution Control 125-35 (U Pittsburgh
Press, 1975).
50. See Implementation of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Committee on Public Works, 92d Cong, 2d
Sess Pts 1-3 (1972); see generallyJones, Clean Air at 261-63 (cited in note 49); Melnick, Regulation and
the Courts at 32 (cited in note 1).
51. Christopher Foreman, Signals from the Hill-CongressionalOversight and the Challenge of Social
Regulation 83 (Yale U Press, 1988); Melnick, Regulation and the Courts at 32 (cited in note 1).
52. Implementation of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970-Part 1: Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Committee on Public Works, 92d Cong, 2d
Sess 236, 243, 324-28 (1972); Federal Regulation and Regulatory Reform, Report by the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 94th Cong, 2d Sess 121-25, 134, 148 (1976); see generally Foreman, Signals from the Hill
at 182 (cited in note 51) (much of claim that bureaucracy "run amok" "originate[s] in simple political
disagreement reflected in conflict within Congress, between Congress and the White House (or
OMB), and ultimately, of course, with society at large").
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Dingell and James Florio, among others, adopted similar styles in the House.
When EPA failed to meet statutory deadlines, these and other members of
Congress held hearings in which they chastised the agency for neglecting the
public trust. 53 Conversely, when EPA made politically unpopular decisions in
an effort to comply with its statutory mandates, other members of Congress
54
promptly joined in the public denunciation.
Indeed, EPA's past twenty years have been marked by persistent
allegations of corruption, scandal, and abuse of public trust. Early on there
were congressional accusations of improper White House interference with
pending litigation .55 There have been continuous congressional allegations
that EPA has improperly allowed 0MB to influence the substance of EPA
56
rules.
53. See, for example, Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, Hearings before the
House Committee on Agriculture, 95th Cong, 1st Sess Part 31 (1977); Extension of the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, Authorization Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, 95th Cong, 1st Sess 89 (1977); Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Transportation and Commerce of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong, 1st Sess 1 (1979); Hazardous Waste
Disposal, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong, 1st Sess 2 (1979); Oversight of
Hazardous Waste Management and the Implementation of the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Governmental Management of the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs, 96th Cong, 1st Sess 1 (1979); Hazardous Waste Matters,
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong, 2d Sess 46-49 (1980).
54. See, for example, 119 Cong Rec 41127-29 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Hudnut); 119 Cong Rec
41728 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Boland); 119 Cong Rec 41305 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Kazen); see
generally John Quarles, Cleaning up America 201-11 (Houghton Mifflin, 1976). Ironically, it is
sometimes those in Congress who sponsored the strict environmental laws who, fearing the
possibility of a legislative backlash, subsequently fault EPA for threatening to apply them according
to their strict terms. See R. Shep Melnick, Deadlines, Common Sense, and Cynicism, The Brookings
Review 21, 22 (Fall 1983); see also Congress, Worried About Shutdowns, Pressures EPA to Push Back UST
Deadlines, 11 Inside EPA 2 (March 9, 1990) (Congress pressuring EPA to push back certain
requirements because of concern with financial impact; EPA reluctant without assurances that it will
not subsequently be criticized by Congress for easing enforcement).
55. See Mercury Pollution and Enforcement of the Refuse Act of 1899, Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Conservation and Natural Resources of the House Committee on Govt
Operations, 92d Cong, Ist & 2d Sess 1134-1228, 1281-1363 (1971 & 1972) (oversight hearings on
White House interference with pending Department of Justice enforcement action against alleged
polluter).
56. See, for example, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution, 92d Cong,
2d Sess 3-177, 224-328 (1972) (accusations that OMB was undermining EPA authority); EPA's
Asbestos Regulations: Report on a Case Study on OMB Interference in Agency Rulemaking
(Committee Print, 1985); EPA: Investigation of Superfund and Agency Abuses, Part 3: Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce, 98th Cong, 1st Sess 5-8, 79-83 (1983) (testimony ofJohn Daniel, administrator's chief of
staff); see also Quarles, Cleaning up America at 117-19 (cited in note 54) (Administrator William
Ruckelshaus reportedly threatened to quit unless President Nixon agreed that EPA and not OMB or
the White House would have final say on the content of EPA rules); Special Report: Office of Management
and Budget Plays CriticalPart in Environmental Policymaking, Faces Little External Review, 7 Envir Rptr Curr
Dev (BNA) 693 (1976); Marc Landy, Marc Roberts & Stephen Thomas, The Environmental Protection
Agency: Asking the II'rong Questions 66-75 (Oxford U Press, 1990) ("Asking the ifrong Questions") (conflict
between OMB (and White House) and EPA (Administrator Costle) concerning promulgation of
ozone standard); Anne Burford, Are You Tough Enough? 83 (McGraw Hill, 1986) (Gorsuch
confrontation with OMB over promulgation of EPA rule). Ruckelshaus said he faced "exactly the
same" problems with OMB review as EPA administrator in the early 1970s, as he did in 1983 and
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Congress has also frequently accused the agency of neglect and of
overreaching. Congressional oversight of EPA's handling of the pesticides
program in the mid-1970s illustrates both. Partly in response to
congressional claims of excessive agency regulation, Administrator Russell
Train reduced the role of lawyers in the general counsel's office, which had
been a strong advocate of stringent pesticide regulation. Soon EPA was
buffeted by allegations of agency neglect; agency lawyers, some of whom
resigned in protest, were upset by the administrator's action and brought
evidence to Congress' attention that EPA had relied on industry data in
registering pesticides under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act. 5 7 To agency officials, their reliance on industry data was the
necessary result of unrealistic statutory deadlines and reduced agency
budgets. To Senate overseers, however, such reliance showed the agency's
capture by industry and its subversion of congressional will at the expense of
58
increased public health hazards.
An example of supposed agency overreaching involved EPA's aborted
effort to require states to develop transportation control plans under the
Clean Air Act to improve air quality. Almost as soon as EPA announced that
states would be required to formulate such plans to meet federally mandated
air quality standards, members of Congress held oversight hearings and made
statements on the floors of their respective chambers in which they uniformly
denounced EPA's intrusion into matters of traditionally state and local
59
concern.
Without a doubt, EPA's most contentious time with Congress occurred
during the tenure of Anne Gorsuch as EPA's administrator from 1981 to
1983.60 Intense congressional scrutiny of Gorsuch's management began soon
after her confirmation. 6 1 There were pervasive congressional concerns that
1984. See Rochelle Stanfield, EPA Administrator Lee Thomas Is More a Manager Than a Policymaker, 18
NatlJ 391, 392 (Feb 15, 1986).
57. Christopher J. Bosso, Pesticides and Politics 197-200 (U Pittsburgh Press, 1987).
58. Id at 199-200.
59. See John Quarles, The Transportation Control Plans-FederalRegulation's Collision with Reality, 2
Harv Envir L Rev 241, 243-48 (1977).
60. Anne Gorsuch changed her last name to Burford following her marriage in February 1983,
which was shortly before she resigned as EPA administrator.
61. In 1981, the chairs of six different committees and subcommittees began to investigate EPA,
including Senator Stafford of the Senate Committee on the Environment and Public Works,
Representative Dingell of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce, Representative Florio of the Subcommittee on Commerce,
Transportation, and Tourism of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Representative
Levitas of the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of the House Committee on Public
Works and Transportation, Representative Synar of the Subcommittee on Environment, Energy, and
Natural Resources of the House Government Operations Committee, and Representative Scheuer of
the Subcommittee on Natural Resources, Agricultural Research, and Environment of the House
Science and Technology Committee. See Reauthorizations, Hearing before the Subcommittee on
Toxic Substances and Environmental Oversight of the Committee on Environment and Public
Works, 97th Cong, 1st Sess 1 (1981) (research and development program of EPA); EPA Oversight:
One-Year Review Joint Hearings before the Subcommittee on Environment, Energy, and Natural
Resources of the House Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittees on Health and the
Environment and on Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism of the House Committee on Energy
and Commerce, and Subcommittees on Natural Resources, Agricultural Research, and Environment
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Gorsuch and other political appointees at the agency were entering into
"sweetheart deals" with industry, 6 2 manipulating programs for partisan
political ends, 6 3 and crippling the agency through requests for budget
reductions. 6 4 The confrontation with Congress, fueled by Congress' massive
oversight efforts, was the decisive factor in causing Gorsuch, as well as most of
65
the other political appointees at the agency, to resign.
The appropriations committees were not especially active in the events
that precipitated Gorsuch's departure, but they have been extremely effective
in overseeing the agency's programs during the last twenty years. 6 6 From the
outset, these committees (particularly the House committees) have closely
scrutinized EPA's programs through the budgetary process. Unlike members
of the committees that drafted the environmental protection laws, many
members of the appropriations committees were not advocates of the
programs. They were instead often quite skeptical of the wisdom of those
laws 6 7 and sought to undermine their statutory mandates

through the

68
appropriation process.
As a result of internal compromise, the leadership in Congress initially
placed EPA's budget within the jurisdiction of the House appropriations
subcommittee on the Department of Housing and Urban Development
("HUD") chaired by Representative Jamie Whitten, an outspoken critic of

and on Investigation and Oversight of the House Committee on Science and Technology, 97th
Cong, 2d Sess 1 (1982).
62. Note, The Conflict between Executive Privilegeand Congressional Oversight: The Gorsuch Controversy,
1983 Duke LJ 1333, 1341 n59 (authored by Ronald L. Claveloux).
63. See EPA Enforcement and Administration of Superfund, Hearings before the Subcommittee
on Oversight and Investigation of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong, 2d
Sess 287-89 (1981 & 1982); Donald V. Feliciano, The U.S. Environmental ProtectionAgency: An Analysis of
Its Controversies 32 (Cong Res Serv, June 1, 1983) ("EPA: An Analysis of Its Controversies"); see also
Howard Kurtz, Political Races Discussed with Superfund Chief, Wash Post Al (March 22, 1983).
64. See Lawrence Mosher, Move OverJim Watt, Anne Gorsuch Is the Latest Target of Environmentalists,
13 NatlJ 1899 (1981).
65. Her assertion of executive privilege in declining to provide agency enforcement files
requested by congressional oversight committees was the event that triggered her departure.
Somewhat ironically, career staff at the Department ofJustice, not Gorsuch, instigated the refusal to
turn over enforcement files because of concern with congressional access. See HR Rep No 99-435,
99th Cong, 1st Sess 10 (1985) (report on Department of Justice role in withholding of EPA
documents from Congress); Milan Savarous Yancy, An Evaluation of the Initial Implementation of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980: The Effect of Vithholding of
Documents by the Environmental Protection Agency from Congress in 1982-83, 76 (unpublished PhD
dissertation, U Texas at Dallas, May 1988) (" Withholding of Documents"); see generally Peter M. Shane,
Legal Disagreement and Negotiation in a Government of Laws: The Case of Executive Privilege Claims Against
Congress, 71 Minn L Rev 461, 508-16 (1987); Note, 1983 Duke LJ 1333 (cited in note 62).
66. Oversight conducted by appropriations committees has been characterized as the most
potent form of oversight. Senate Study on Federal Regulation at 42 (cited in note 8); see Morris P.
Fiorina, Congress, Keystone of the Washington Establishment 42-43 (Yale U Press, 1977).
67. See, for example, Agriculture-Environmental and Consumer Protection Appropriations for
1974, Hearings before the Subcommittee on HUD-Independent Agencies of the House Committee
on Appropriations, 93d Cong, Ist Sess Pt 5, 789-90 (1973) (testimony of EPA Administrator William
Ruckelshaus).
68. James L. Regens & Robert W. Rycroft, Funding for Environmental Protection: Comparing
Congressionaland Executive Influences, 26 Soc SciJ 289. 299 (1989); Steven A. Cohen, EPA: A Qualified
Success, in Sheldon Kamieniecki & Michael Clarke, eds, Controversies in Environmental Policy 181 (State U
NY Press, 1986).

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 54: No. 4

many of the environmental laws. 69 Whitten used the appropriations process
to conduct lengthy inquiries into the agency's implementation of those laws.
He lobbied the administrator on pesticide matters of concern to agricultural
interests, 70 and he subsequently denounced EPA when it failed to heed his
advice. 7' He also openly stated his view that Congress may not have intended
72
full implementation of the environmental laws that it had passed.

According to Whitten, the appropriations process provided a way to "limit
73
use of money" in order to cut back on those laws.

III
REASONS FOR QUANTITY AND QUALITY OF CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT OF

EPA

Several explanations exist for the intensity and the highly adversarial
quality of Congress's oversight of EPA over the past twenty years. Some of
these explanations are historical, wholly coincidental to the development of
federal environmental protection law. Much of the oversight, however,
reflects the depth of conflict embedded in the substance of environmental
policy and the ways in which that conflict challenges our governmental
institutions.
A.

Historical Factors

One reason for intense congressional scrutiny of EPA is that the agency's
creation coincided with a general increase in congressional oversight of
executive branch activities. There was enhanced congressional concern at the
time about the dangers of "agency capture." The "agency capture" thesis,
launched in the early works of Professor Marver Bernstein,7 4 describes the
tendency of regulatory agencies to become too closely affiliated with those
69. Bosso, Pesticides at 154 (cited in note 57); see also Douglas Murray, The Politics of Pesticides:
Corporate Power and Popular Struggle over the Regulatory Process 77 (unpublished PhD dissertation, U
California, Santa Cruz, 1983) (describing political compromise resulting in assignment of EPA
budget to agriculture appropriations subcommittee).
70. Agriculture-Environmental and Consumer Protection Appropriations for 1972, Hearings
before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 92d Cong, Ist Sess 382 (1971)
(hearings concerning DDT).
71. See Agriculture-Environmental and Consumer Protection Appropriations for 1974,
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 93d Cong, 1st Sess
475-76 (1973).
72. Department of Housing and Urban Development-Independent Agencies Appropriations
for 1973, Hearings before the Subcommittee on HUD-Independent Agencies of the House
Committee on Appropriations, 92d Cong, 2d Sess 350 (1972) (statement of Rep. Whitten).
73. Id. Representative Whitten surrendered subcommittee jurisdiction over EPA in 1974 to
avoid a confrontation and possible liberal challenge to his eventual succession as chair of the House
Appropriations Committee. Foreman, Signals from the Hill at 195 (cited in note 51); see Bosso,
Pesticides at 187-89 (cited in note 57). Whitten is presently chair of the House Appropriations
Committee. Pursuant to a 1975 reform, however, the subcommittee chairs of the House
Appropriations Committee are quite independent of the full committee chair because they are
elected by the full Democratic caucus. Fred Barnes, Congressional Despots, Then and .Vow, 100 Pub
Interest 45. 49 (Summer 1990).
74. Marver H. Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commission 79-94 (Princeton U Press,
1955); James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and I'hvy Thes, Do It 73-74 (Basic
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they regulate. At roughly the same time that EPA was created, Ralph Nader's
organization published a series of books that, relying on Bernstein's thesis,
accused various federal agencies of having been "captured" by the regulated
75
community.
Also in the early 1970s, congressional distrust of the Nixon Administration
grew. While this distrust was fueled initially by the President's handling of the
Vietnam war, the administration's lack of credibility on Capitol Hill did not
remain confined to the war. It spread to the administration's dealings with
76
Congress in a wide range of areas, including the environment.
Another factor precipitating increased congressional oversight was
President Nixon's effort to exert greater control over the work product of the
federal bureaucracy, by, for example, creating OMB. 77 Congress naturally
became concerned about maintaining its ability to influence federal agencies.
Many representatives became convinced that Congress needed to develop its
own resources in order to serve as an objective, knowledgeable, and
independent overseer of the bureaucracy. These concerns with presidential
control have not dissipated over the last twenty years, perhaps partly because
different political parties have controlled the White House and at least one
chamber of Congress for all but the four years from 1977 through 1980.
Increased congressional oversight also results from the growth of the
federal administrative bureaucracy during the last two decades. During this
period, the number and reach of federal regulations grew several-fold. The
number of pages in the Federal Register provides a rough, but illustrative,
measure of that phenomenon. In 1970, the Federal Register contained
78
20,032 pages; by 1980, it totalled 87,012 pages.
This increase in bureaucratic activity caused a correspondingly dramatic
increase in the number of congressional staff during the early 1970s and
greater congressional reliance on subcommittee government to provide
oversight. Between 1960 and 1984, congressional staff grew from 7,091 to
17,963; the number of subcommittee staff during that same period grew from
910 to 3,183. 79 In addition, congressional reforms in the 1970s gave
Books, 1990); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv L Rev 1667,
1685-86 (1975).
75. Robert C. Fellmeth, John E. Schuhz & Edward F. Cox, The Nader Report on the Federal Trade
Commission (R.W. Barron, 1969); James S. Turner, The Chemical Feast (Grossman, 1970); Robert C.
Fellmeth, The Interstate Commerce Ommission: The Public Interest and the ICC (Grossman, 1970); John C.
Esposito, Vanishing Air (Grossman, 1970); David Zwick & Marcy Benstock, IVater Wasteland (Grossman,
1971).
76. See S Doc No 100-45 at 19 (cited in note 48); see also Melnick, Regulation and the Courts at 33
(cited in note 1).
77. See generally Richard P. Nathan, The Plot that Failed: Nixon and the Administrative Presidency (j.
Wiley, 1975).
78. NAPA, Oversight Study at 2 (cited in note 9). By 1986, during the heyday of President
Reagan's deregulatory efforts, the number of pages decreased to 47,418, which was still significantly
higher than in 1970. See also Aberbach, Watchful Eye at 43-46 (cited in note 7).
79. See Shane, 71 Minn L Rev at 464 (cited in note 65); Aberbach, Watchful Eye at 46 (cited in
note 7); Foreman, Signalsfrom the Hill at 16 (cited in note 51) (personal staffs grew from 1,150 in 1930
to 10,679 by end of 1970s; committee staffs grew from 275 to over 3,000 in the same period). The
staffs of the Senate and House committees and subcommittees with jurisdiction over environmental
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additional powers to subcommittees and their chairs. For example, in the
1950s, full committees held most hearings and debates; subcommittees held
only 20 to 30 percent of the hearings. By the late 1970s and the 95th
Congress, subcommittees held over 90 percent of all hearings; their decisions
were more authoritative; full committee chairs could chair only one
subcommittee; and subcommittee chairs increasingly served as the floor
managers for bills.8 0 To assist the subcommittees' efforts, Congress created
or substantially expanded the GAO, 8' Office of Technology Assessment,8 2
Congressional Budget Office, 3 and Library of Congress's Congressional
Research Service. 84 These additional resources were devoted substantially to
85
oversight.
The last twenty years have also witnessed the emergence of the political
phenomenon known as "interest group politics." During this period,
individual legislators have become increasingly responsive to the lobbying
efforts of single issue organizations.8 6 One expression of interest group
politics has been enhanced congressional oversight of federal agencies of
concern to particular groups.8 7 In order to influence agency behavior, an
interest group may try to persuade a subcommittee chair to hold an oversight
hearing at which the group could air its concerns.
Finally, the growth of the national news media, especially the broadcast
media, undoubtedly has been a significant catalyst for congressional
oversight. Indeed, a symbiotic relationship has developed between the two.
Television, in particular, provides public exposure to elected representatives;
issues have significantly increased during the last several decades. History of the Senate Committee at 19
(cited in note 48) (staff of the Senate Committee on the Environment and Public Works increased in
the late 1960s and early 1970s in response to hostility between Congress and the administration).
According to one survey, 11 Senate and 45 House committee staff members were concerned with
environmental problems in 1960; 34 Senate and 42 House in 1970; 70 Senate and 112 House in
1975; 74 Senate and 160 House in 1979; and 56 Senate and 151 House in 1981. SeeJohn Pitney,
Hazardous Politics: Toxic Waste and American Government 39 (unpublished PhD dissertation, Yale U,
1985).
80. See Lawrence Dodd & Bruce Oppenheimer, The Howe in Transition: Change and Consolidation,
in Lawrence Dodd & Bruce Oppenheimer, eds, Congress Reconsidered 40-48 (Cong Q Press, 2d ed
1981).
81. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub L No 91-510, § 204, 84 Stat 1168 (1970);
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974, Pub L No 93-344, § 702, 88 Stat 326 (1974).
82. Technology Assessment Act of 1972, Pub L No 92-484, § 3, 86 Stat 797-803 (1972).
83. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub L No 93-344, §§ 201203, 88 Stat 302-05 (1974).
84. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub L No 91-510, § 321, 84 Stat 1181-85 (1970).
85. See text accompanying notes 12, 18.
86. See generally Kay Lehman Schlozman & John T. Tierny, Organized Interests and American
Democracy 1-13, 289-317 (Harper & Row, 1983). For an entertaining and informative description of
the ways in which special interest groups.seek to influence the legislative process, see Jeffrey H.
Birnbaum & Alan S. Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch (Random House, 1988) (congressional passage
of the 1986 Tax Reform Act).
87. Conversely, the dispersion of power into subcommittees may have been a precipitating
cause of the growth in influence of interest groups. Interest groups seek influence over numerous
subcommittees; however, subcommittees, because of their limited policy domain, depend upon only
one or two interest groups for electoral support. Subcommittees are uniquely effective loci for
interest groups to bring their power to bear. See Dodd & Schott, Administrative State at 181-83 (cited
in note 18).
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oversight provides a media event conducive to television news. C-Span's
comprehensive coverage of congressional activities reflects and perpetuates
this phenomenon.
One immediate effect of the national news media has been the promotion
of "fire alarm" oversight. Such oversight occurs in response to allegations of
controversy, scandal, or corruption, often occuring within the government
itself.8 8 Fire alarm oversight thus alerts the public to a major problem and,
not incidentally, publicizes Congress's effort to respond.
Because environmental issues bear a particularly close relationship to
public health-the initial handle for much early environmental legislationmany in the national media have been ready to pay special heed to claims of
agency dereliction. 8 9 No doubt Senator Muskie was aware of this
phenomenon; he used environmental issues and oversight of EPA's work
quite effectively to bolster his own presidential aspirations. 90 Others have
followed his lead, particularly Representative John Dingell, who similarly has
used congressional oversight of environmental issues and EPA to expand his
political power base and increase his national prestige. 9 '
Fire alarm oversight, by its nature, is also disproportionately negative.
Consequently, most formal oversight of EPA through public hearings has
been of that quality. Because, moreover, many in Congress base the success
of fire alarm oversight on its ability to attract media attention, committee staff
in arranging such hearings favor witnesses less likely to qualify their views
(that is, more ready to exaggerate) and therefore more likely to produce
newspaper headlines and effective sound bites.
B.

Inherent Factors

Certain factors inherent in fashioning federal environmental protection
policy virtually have guaranteed both the intensity and highly adversarial
88. See Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked. Police
Patrols Versus FireAlarms, 28 AmJ Pol Sci 165 (1984); NAPA, Oversight Study at 12 (cited in note 9). In
his recent book on congressional oversight, Professor Aberbach posits that "police-patrol"
oversight-in which the committee staff regularly oversees the agency's work looking out for possible
problems-is likewise on the rise. According to Aberbach, one reason why committees are
increasingly relying on police patrol oversight is that they now possess the staff required to undertake
such a resource-intensive endeavor. Aberbach, Watchful EVe at 98-101 (cited in note 7).
89. Foreman, Signals fiom the Hill at 38-45 (cited in note 51).
90. J. Clarence Davies & Barbara S. Davies, The Politics of Pollution 78 (Bobbs Merrill, 2d ed 1975)
("Pollution"); Melnick, Regulation and the Courts at 32 (cited in note 1); compare Elliott, Ackerman &
Millian, I J L Econ & Org at 334-35 (cited in note 2).
91. Representative Dingell from Michigan is likely the most aggressive of current congressional
overseers. See David Rosenbaum, Washington at Work; ,Ilichigan Democrat Presides as Capital's Grand
Inquisitor, NY Times Al col 5 (Sept 30, 1991); Barnes, 100 Pub Interest at 51-53 (cited in note 73).
Of course, those in Congress who sought to exploit the advantages of "fire alarm" oversight in the
environmental context have not been limited to those faulting the agency for insufficient
environmental protection. There have been plenty in Congress equally quick to criticize the agency
for the tremendous costs imposed on society by the federal environmental laws. See text
accompanying note 59. For instance, because of his natural interest in protecting the auto industry,
Representative Dingell frequently plays both sides of the fence. See Norman J. Vig & Michael E.
Kraft, eds, Environmental Policy in the 1980s: Reagan's New Agenda 84, 90 (Cong Q Press, 1984).
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quality of congressional oversight of EPA. These factors include (1) the
moralistic, indeed, spiritual quality of many of the arguments in favor of
environmental protection; (2) the tremendous complexity of ecosystems and,
consequently, the great scientific uncertainty associated with our
understanding of the degradation process, its reversal, and the relationship of
environmental factors to human health; (3) the temporal gap between the
costs of environmental controls, which are immediate, and the resulting
benefits, which are not, as well as the resistance of those benefits to market
valuation techniques; and (4) the depth of change in existing industrial
practices and current American lifestyle necessary to realize significant
improvements in environmental quality.
The Earth Day celebration of April 1970 marked this nation's spiritual
awakening to environmental problems. The strongly moralistic overtones of
the cries for reduced pollution allowed little room for pragmatic debate about
the issues. As a result, the development of public expectations for
environmental protection was not accompanied by any threshold
understanding of what would actually be necessary to change past practices in
order to improve environmental quality.
Consistent with the widespread sentiment in favor of environmental
protection, Congress passed a series of dramatic and uncompromising
environmental statutes. Congress instructed EPA, in effect, "to eliminate
water pollution, end all risk from air pollution, prevent hazardous waste from
reaching ground water, establish standards for all toxic drinking water
contaminants, and register all pesticides." 92 Congress did not make any
meaningful effort in those laws to bridge the gap between the nation's
aspirations for environmental protection and its technological, economic, and
cultural capacity for change.
Congress also mandated that EPA perform those tasks within extremely
short deadlines. Reflecting congressional distrust of the executive branch, 86
percent of the deadlines applied to EPA in the first instance, rather than to the
regulated community; 93 one-third were for six months or less; 94 and 60
percent were for one year or less. 95 The deadlines left little time for EPA to

develop the scientific and technological expertise necessary to defend its
implementation of the laws from attack either from those concerned about
inadequate protection of public health or those concerned about the
imposition of possibly needless, yet costly, environmental regulation.
Nor did the legislation anticipate the scientific complexity of
environmental problems. The relationships within ecosystems are
wonderfully intricate. Indeed, perhaps the greatest insight yielded from
92. Council on Environmental Quality, Sixteenth Annual Report 14 (U.S. Govt Printing Office,
1985).
93. Statutor-v Deadlines in Environnental Legislation: Necessary But Need Improvement I I (Envir &
Energy Study Inst, Sept 1985) ("EESI, Statutory Deadlines in Environmental Legislation"). The remaining
14% applied to the regulated community and the states.
94. Id at 13-14.
95. Id.
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environmental research during the last twenty years is how little we
understand. EPA's programs, therefore, generally face major gaps in
scientific knowledge. Agency officials can either delay action pending further
scientific investigation or act on the basis of limited scientific knowledge.
9 6
Either response, however, is likely to trigger congressional criticism.
In addition, the cost of environmental regulation contrasted sharply with
its benefits in ways that made EPA's job especially susceptible to secondguessing and that gave strong economic incentives to criticize the agency.
The cost of pollution control and cleanup has been immediate, concrete, and
massive. As the National Academy of Sciences concluded, "the regulatory
reach of the EPA program is probably unparalleled.19 7 Indeed, virtually no
significant economic activity has been unaffected. GAO estimates that the
societal cost of EPA programs since 1970 has been $700 billion and now
totals about $86 billion each year.98 The United States currently devotes
approximately 2 percent of GNP to pollution control, and that amount is
expected to rise to approximately 2.8 percent by the end of the decade.9 9
In contrast, environmental benefits are amorphous, difficult to measure,
and tend to be realized only in the long term. Great scientific uncertainty
surrounds the relationship between pollution levels and environmental
quality, let alone environmental quality and public health and welfare.
Environmental values also defy ready economic measurement, prompting
many environmentalists to resist comparing the economic costs and benefits
of environmental protection programs. 0 0 Lacking a common denominator, a
polarization of views has persisted in the debate over environmental policy,
and EPA has constantly been attacked by all sides.
The benefits of environmental protection policies also challenge the
tendency of elected officials and the electorate to demand immediate return
on their investment. Just as the harm caused by environmental pollution may
not be immediately discernible, reductions in environmental pollution
frequently do not lead to immediate, discernible improvements in
environmental quality. The safeguards mandated by EPA benefit future
generations at great economic cost to those in the present. Although
differently motivated, neither the regulated community nor the
environmentalists historically have exhibited much patience in waiting for the
positive return. The former claims that the benefits are illusory; the latter
argue that EPA is too slow in their delivery.

96. See Joel Yellin, Science, Technology, and Administrative Government: Institutional Designs for
Environmental Decision Making, 92 Yale L J 1300 (1983); see also Note, The EPA and Biotechnology
Regulation: Coping with Scientific Uncertainty, 95 Yale LJ 553 (1986) (authored by Ruth E. Harlow).
97. 2 Decision Making in the Environmental Protection Agency-Selected Working Papers 2 (Natl Acad
Sciences, 1977).
98. Dept of the Environment Act of 1990, S Rep No 101-262, 101st Cong, 2d Sess 15 (1990).
99. William K. Stevens, 27o OfG.N.P. Spent by U.S. On Cleanup, NY Times A13 col I (Dec 23,
1990).
100. Mark Sagoff. The Economy of the Earth: Philosophy., Law and the Environment (Cambridge U Press,
1988).
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Thus, much of the contentiousness evident in EPA's relationship with
Congress over the last twenty years results from the collision between the
aspirations of the early federal environmental laws and the resistance of
institutional and cultural forces to the changes those laws require.' 0 '
Historically, EPA has served as the focal point of criticism from interest
groups on every side of this conflict, ranging from those who charge EPA with
undermining the federal environmental laws to those who charge the agency
with regulatory excesses in their implementation. The vehicle for much of
this criticism has been congressional oversight. Each interest group has
found at least one sympathetic ear within Congress, which typically suffices to
trigger a formal or informal congressional inquiry.
Not surprisingly, Congress has spoken with many different voices in its
oversight of EPA. Some members express concern about EPA's possible
capture by the regulated community. These members also often voice
concern about the bureaucratic tendency to capitulate to the executive branch
because of the influence exerted upon it by powerful economic interests
generally opposed to expensive pollution control measures. 0 2 Many of these
representatives drafted the environmental statutes in a manner designed to
minimize the possibility of agency capture or of bureaucratic neglect and
compromise. Other members of Congress, some of whom served on the
appropriations committees, have been more concerned about the potential
dangers of a bureaucracy run amok, such as the imposition of excessive costs
03
on the nation's economy.1

Finally, controversies endemic to the fashioning of federal environmental
protection policy contributed to intense congressional oversight of EPA and
to the growing schism between the executive and legislative branches during
the last twenty years. A marked lack of consensus concerning the proper
direction of federal environmental protection policy exists between the two
branches. Regardless of party affiliation, each president since 1970 has been
more concerned about the impact of environmental laws on national
04
economic indicators than have been the drafters of those laws.
President Nixon's veto of 1972 federal water pollution control
legislation,' 0 5 which was overridden, and his subsequent impoundment of
congressional appropriations earmarked for the water pollution control
101. See RichardJ. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal Environmental Law,
54 L & Contemp Probs 311, 342 (Autumn 1991).
102. Landy, Roberts & Thomas, Asking the W1rong Questions at 33-34 (cited in note 56).
103. Davies & Davies, Pollution at 73-44 (cited in note 90).
104. Melnick, Regulation and the Courts at 34-5 (cited in note 1). Generally, oversight is reduced
when the president and a majority of a particular chamber of Congress are affiliated with the same
national political party. Aberbach, IWatchful Eye at 59-60 (cited in note 7); Dodd & Schott, The
Administrative State at 226 (cited in note 18). For 10 of EPA's 20 years of existence, the president and
the majority of at least one of the congressional chambers have been affiliated with the same party
(1976-80; 1981-86). When the Republicans were the majority party in the Senate. however, a wide
gulf in philosophy on environmental issues persisted between the White House and those in relevant
Senate leadership positions. Melnick, Regulation and the Courts at 32 (cited in note 1).
105. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 8 Wkly Comp Pres l)ocs 1531
(Oct 17, 1972).
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program appear to be the first shots in an ongoing battle between Congress
and the White House over environmental policy.' 0 6 The Supreme Court held
the presidential impoundment unlawful,' 0 7 but presidents have continued to
veto pollution control legislation.' 0 3 All presidents have argued for more
fiscal responsibility within those laws.
Each president has also assigned 0MB increasing authority to review EPA
rulemaking to ensure greater consideration of economic concerns. Under
President Nixon, OMB Director George Schultz instructed OMB to undertake
this oversight function just a few months after EPA's creation.' 0 9 0MB review
has remained a point of contention between EPA and OMB under all
subsequent presidents,' 10 although President Reagan gave OMB the greatest
leverage over the agency.' I
During President Reagan's first term, White House staff engaged in a
determined effort to appoint individuals to EPA who possessed a heightened
sensitivity to the cost of pollution control generally and to industry concerns
in particular.' 12 0MB officials played a major role in the interview and
selection process.' 1 3 Hence, all presidential appointees, ranging from the
administrator herself to each of the assistant and associate administrators and
the general counsel, shared a political philosophy and a sense of mission at
odds with that reflected in the federal statutes and embraced by the agency's
bureaucracy. No president previously had sought to invade the agency from
within.
Congress responded to OMB's enhanced review authority by steadily
increasing its own oversight resources in an effort to serve as a counterweight.
Congress also responded by holding hearings in which members repeatedly
questioned the propriety of OMB oversight of EPA's work. Indeed, OMB's
106. In fiscal years 1973 and 1974, President Nixon withheld six billion dollars from funds
authorized by Congress for the Federal Water Pollution Control Act's construction grants program.
Train v City of New York, 420 US 35, 38-40 (1975). In fiscal year 1975, he impounded three billion
dollars of authorized funds. Id at 40 n4. It is no coincidence that it was the Congressional Budget
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 that enhanced congressional oversight potential through the
Congressional Budget Office and the GAO. See text accompanying notes 81, 83.
107. See Train, 420 US at 48.
108. See Veto of Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Bill, II Wkly Comp Pres Docs 4. 5
(Dec 30, 1974); Veto of the Water Quality Act of 1987, 23 Wkly Comp Pres Docs 97 (Jan 30, 1987).
109. Shultz advised EPA's first administrator, William Ruckelshaus, on May 21, 1971, that EPA
would have to clear its regulations with OMB and the Department of Commerce prior to their
promulgation. Alfred Allen Marcus, Promise and Performance: Choosing and Implementing An
Environmental PolicY 125 (Greenwood, 1980); Stanley Bach, Governmental Constraints in Environmental
Regulation, in 2b Decisionmaking in the Environmental Protection Agency-Selected IlForking Papers 163, 16871, 173-74, 178-81 (Natl Acad Sciences, 1977).
110. See NAPA, PresidentialManagement at 25 (cited in note 5).
111. See generally Olson. 4 Va J Nat Res L 1 (cited in note 5).
112. Feliciano, EP': .In Analysis of Its Controversies at 8 (cited in note 63); Susan J. Tolchin &
Martin Tolchin, Dismantling Ameca: The Rush to Deregulate 100-01 (Houghton Millin, 1983).
113. See Burford, Are )ou Tough Enough? at 84 (cited in note 56) (describing how an OMB official
asked an applicant for position of EPA administrator whether he "would be willing to bring EPA to
its knees").
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oversight has been a constant source of friction between the legislative and
executive branches, with EPA at the fulcrum.' 14
Moreover, presidential appointments of persons such as Anne Gorsuch
ignited the pre-existing embers of congressional concern with agency capture.
With officials like Gorsuch in control of EPA, the worst fears of many in
Congress seemed finally to have been realized. As a result, the congressional
oversight arsenal was directed with full force at EPA. Ultimately, the entire
agency was engulfed in controversy. '15
The Gorsuch era ended almost eight years ago, but there has been
surprisingly little change since in the amount and character of congressional
oversight of EPA. Oversight remains intense and is predominantly negative.
There is a simple, yet important, explanation for this phenomenon. The
Gorsuch era was a prominent expression of the tensions underlying
Congress's relationship with EPA. It was not, however, the cause of these
tensions, which have deeper roots than mere partisan politics or one
administrator's personality.' 16

IV
THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT OF

EPA

The advantages of congressional oversight of EPA are undeniably
substantial. Congressional overseers have exposed instances of agency
neglect and even corruption. Certainly they played a critical role in ridding
EPA of destructive forces within the agency during President Reagan's first
term. Oversight has also served as an important counterweight to OMB,
which has often appeared to wield influence antithetical to the policies and
purposes of the environmental laws enacted by Congress.' " 7 Finally,
oversight can be commended for providing an opportunity to educate elected
representatives about the intricacies of environmental law and policy, thereby
enabling legislators to make more considered judgments in their subsequent
amendment of the federal laws.' 18
Congressional oversight of EPA has, however, also had adverse effects.
These effects are not unique to EPA. They are the potential problems
generally associated with the rise of subcommittee government in Congress:
how fragmentation of authority impedes effective congressional and agency
decisionmaking, and how the empowerment of subcommittee chairs to
conduct oversight grants them great power but little accountability for their
114. See generally Robert V. Percival, Checks without Balance: Executive Office Oversight of the
Enviionmental Protection Agency, 54 L & Contemp Probs 127 (Autumn 1991).
115. See Jonathan Lash, Katherine Gillman & David Sheridan, A Season of Spoils: The Story of the
Reagan Administration 's Attack on the Environment (Pantheon, 1984); see text accompanying notes 60-65.
116. See text accompanying notes 48-59; Lazarus, 54 L & Contemp Probs at 336-40 (cited ill
note 101).
117. NAPA, Oversight Study at 29 (cited in note 9).
118.
Dwyer, 17 Ecol L Qat 291-98 (cited in note 3).

.Page 205: Autumn 1991]

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF

EPA

actions.' 19 In the case of EPA, many of those concerns have apparently been
realized, possibly to an unprecedented degree.' 20 Moreover, because "the
benefits [of oversight] are highly celebrated and the possible costs
understated," 121 the disadvantages of oversight are discussed here in greater
detail.
First, the intensity and negative quality of congressional oversight of EPA
has done much to create and perpetuate the view that EPA is incompetent,
negligent, and even corrupt. In isolated instances, such a public image may
well have been justified. In many cases, however, it plainly was not.
Frequently, the agency's failures, controversies, and scandals highlighted
during congressional oversight resulted from clashes of institutional forces
outside EPA's control; they were not usually the result of program
22
mishandling by the agency. 1
One significant adverse effect of EPA's poor reputation has been the
undermining of the agency's ability to implement the federal environmental
protection statutes by eroding judicial and public confidence. Because so
much scientific uncertainty surrounds agency decisions, EPA actions often
cannot be sustained in court unless the agency is given the benefit of the
doubt. In addition, public confidence in EPA decisions regarding public
health is essential. In its absence, EPA must expend considerable resources to
overcome the resistance of the very public whose support is an important
23
measure of the agency's success.'
Second, the oversight process may also have contributed to retarding the
evolution of federal environmental law. Much of the myth of EPA's
"regulatory failure" has been perpetuated by the oversight process as those in
119. See Aberbach, Watchful Eye at 12 (cited in note 7) (oversight may be "counterproductive
from the standpoint of the balance of power between elected and nonelected officials and of
coordinated control of policy and administration"); Dodd & Schot, Congress and the Administrative State
at 173 (cited in note 18) (oversight characterized as "dispersed and haphazard"); id at 182 (increased
congressional dependence on interest groups); id at 214 (oversight's effects on agencies); id at 397
(subcommittee chairs described as "power entrepreneurs"); NAPA, Oversight Study at 43-50 (cited in
note 9) (setting forth recommendations to redress problems presented by current congressional
oversight practices); Senate Study on Federal Regulation (cited in note 8) (emphasizing the need for
greater coordination between oversight committees).
120. NAPA's 1989 report on congressional oversight appears to reach a similar conclusion. See
NAPA, Oversight Study at 19-30 (cited in note 9). That study includes a specific discussion on
congressional oversight of EPA. Id.
121. Aberbach, Il'atchful Eve at 10 (cited in note 7).
122. See Lazarus, 54 L & Contemp Probs at 313-14 (cited in note 101).
123. For instance, in his initial report to Congress on the Superfund program, EPA's current
administrator, William Reilly, concluded that the "legacy of public distrust" surrounding EPA's
management and "the barrage of criticism leveled at the program nationally" had caused the agency
to lose its "most valuable asset, the benefit of the doubt." William Reilly, A Management Review of
the Superfund Program ch 5 at 4 (EPA, 1989). According to Reilly, the public consequently did not
trust EPA to represent its interests in Superfund negotiations, and the ultimate effect was to slow
clean up efforts. Id at 5-1 to 5-4; see William D. Ruckelshaus, A'ot In .1M' Backvard: Institutional
Problems in Environmental Protection, reprinted in 130 Cong Rec 9803, 9804 (April 1984) (address
before the Economic Club of Detroit) ("[FIrom the standpoint of an American governmental agency
charged with protecting human health and the environment, trust is the oil in the gearbox. ...
W [hen [the public] ceases to believe that the agency is trying to act in the public interest, that agency
cannot finction at all.").
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Congress have derided agency officials for failing to meet statutory mandates
that were unattainable anyway. In response to these perceived instances of
agency failure, Congress usually has returned to the manner in which it
historically oversaw the federal bureaucracy prior to its explosive growth this
century: detailed prescription of the terms of the agency's implementation of
the law. '

24

While legislative prescription had some advantages (for example, it
increased congressional accountability), 2 5 they came at the expense of the
kind of flexibility EPA needed to respond to the uncertain contours of
environmental problems. Congress and EPA have rarely known the best way
to respond to an environmental pollution problem at the time a statute was
passed. The implementation of environmental standards has necessarily
required substantial groping in the dark because policymakers have chosen
not to risk environmental quality and human health by waiting for the elusive
notion of scientific certainty. Statutory prescription therefore is an especially
risky endeavor. It can lead to wasteful expenditures for pollution control and,

124. See text accompanying notes 6-7. The agency's failure to meet the initial deadlines
undermined the credibility of the agency to resist these increasingly restrictive legislative initiatives.
See Ogul, Congress Oversees the Bureaucracy at 49, 181-82 (cited in note 10); Gary C. Bryner, Bureaucratic
Discretion: Law and Policy in Federal Regulatory Agencies 2 (Pergamon Press, 1987); William D.
Ruckelshaus, Environmental Protection: A Brief History, 15 Envir L 455, 463 (1985); Schoenbrod, 30
UCLA L Rev at 793 (cited in note 2).
Amendments to various environmental statutes from the 1970s through the 1990s all exhibit the
same trend toward increased statutory prescription. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub L
No 95-95, 91 Stat 685 (1977), codified at 42 USC § 7401 (1988); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,
Pub L No 10 1-549, 104 Stat 2399 (1990); Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub L No 95-217, 91 Stat 1566
(1977), codified at 33 USC § 1251 (1988); Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub L No 100-4, 101 Stat 7
(1987), codified at 33 USC § 1251 (1988); Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986,
Pub L No 99-499, 100 Stat 1613 (1986), codified at 42 USC § 9601 (1988); Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act Amendments of 1988, Pub L No 100-532, 102 Stat 2654 (1988),
codified at 42 USC § 6901 (1988); Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub L No 98616, 98 Stat 3221 (1984), codified at 42 USC § 6901 (1988); Safe Drinking Water Act, Pub L No 99339, 100 Stat 642 (1986), codified at 42 USC § 201 (1988); Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub L No
99-519. 100 Stat 2970 (1986), codified at 15 USC § 2601 (1988). Each eliminated substantial EPA
discretion, imposed more deadlines, and included more detail concerning the methods and
standards to be employed by the agency. Shapiro & Glicksman, 1988 Duke LJ at 1829-30 (cited in
note 4).
The administrative tasks included in those laws are also no less enormous (and indeed greater)
than those contained in earlier laws. The likelihood of a series of new EPA "failures" therefore
seems great. If that occurs, the scenario that EPA officials fear will result is another round of
oversight hearings and even more prescriptive legislation. Paul R. Portney, ed, Public Policies for
Environmental Protection 284-86 (Resources for the Future, 1990); Shapiro & Glicksman, 1988 Duke UJ
at 1828 (cited in note 4); Ruckelshaus, 16 EPAJ at 15 (cited in note 47).
125. Of course, one possible advantage of legislative prescription is that it may decrease the need
for subsequent congressional oversight. Ironically, for that reason, some in Congress argue that an
advantage of congressional, oversight is that it provides Congress with an option other than
legislative prescription to ensure that the agency is not abdicating its statutory responsibilities. See,
for example, HR Rep No 99-253, 99th Cong, 1st Sess 55-56 (1985) ("If the new law was overly
detailed and restricted in its prescription of how the agency should operate Superfund, it would
almost surely doom the program to future failures. Congressional oversight is the way to ensure
diligent and good faith behavior from an Agency.").
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by way of missed opportunity, to more, rather than less, environmental
degradation. '

26

The threat of congressional scrutiny and accusations of agency misconduct
have also chilled decisionmaking and innovation within EPA. Agency officials
fear overseers' reactions to agency decisions and to any changes in agency
programs; they worry, in particular, about how some in Congress might use
an agency decision as a basis for launching an attack on the agency. The mere
anticipation of congressional criticism is often enough to dissuade agency
decisionmaking, including experimentation with new approaches to
environmental problems.' 2 7 Agency efforts to promote cross-media
regulation are one significant example. (A cross-media regulatory scheme
considers a polluting activity's impact on the natural environment as a whole,
in contrast to the existing legal regime, under which an activity's impact on
various environmental media (air, water, land) are separately regulated.)
Administrator William Ruckelshaus shied away from its implementation
during his first term in office because of potential congressional criticism, and
subsequent efforts have stalled for related reasons. 28 Similar jurisdictional
clashes are evident as the agency seeks to implement pollution prevention
programs.

29

1

Another disadvantage of congressional oversight is that it can require
considerable expenditure of limited agency resources. Agency testimony
must be prepared, which often requires substantial staff work. The EPA must
also coordinate its testimony with OMB. After the hearing is completed, EPA
must respond to requests for additional information that committee members
and their staff make at the hearing.
While the resources necessary to respond to any one oversight inquiry are
unlikely to pose an undue burden, the cumulative effect of the hundreds of
oversight hearings to which EPA is called has, in the past, reduced
significantly EPA's ability to devote sufficient resources to program
implementation. For this reason, EPA officials have complained that
congressional oversight is sometimes the cause of the agency's inability to

126. See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 Stan L Rev
1267 (1985); see also Bruce A. Ackerman & William Hassler, Clean Coal/DirtyAir 42-58 (Yale U Press,
1981).
127. Former EPA Administrator Lee Thomas reportedly commented that oversight often "has a
chilling effect on decision making in the agency. You need to be able to make reasonable decisions
with the understanding that you're accountable for them, you may well hear about them, but that it's
not going to end up as some kind of posturing, personal attack." NAPA, Oversight Study at 27 (cited in
note 9).
128. See Davies & Davies, Pollition at 105-06 (cited in note 90); Lakshman Guruswamy, Integrating

ionimental Mind?, 1989 Vis 1, Rev 463, 487-89.
Thoughtwavs: Reopening of tlie
129. See Congiesstmen to Push Mandatory High-Level EPA Pollution Prevention Office, 10 Inside EPA 5
(Nov 3, 1989).
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meet congressional goals. 3 0° In extreme circumstances, it has virtually
3
paralyzed the agency.' '
In addition, congressional oversight has tended to skew EPA's priorities.
With limited resources, EPA constantly faces the difficult question of how to
prioritize the various issues on its statutory agenda. Political realities,
however, often require the agency to adjust its priorities in response to the
requests and complaints of individual subcommittee chairs with oversight
leverage. 13 2 The resulting agenda is unlikely to bear any close relationship to
that which would be dictated by an objective assessment of competing
priorities. Indeed, EPA priorities appear to have been poorly allocated partly
33
as a result of fragmented and uncoordinated legislative oversight.'
Another victim of oversight has been agency morale, since the barrage of
criticism has inevitably affected employee self-esteem. The EPA employees
have been deprived of that which prompted many to join the agency in the
first instance-a sharing of the agency's social mission. 13 4 This has made it
more difficult for EPA to recruit the most qualified agency personnel and may
also be a cause of high agency turnover. 13 5 The latter is especially
problematic for an agency like EPA. Long term strategic planning is an
essential component of an effective environmental protection program, but it
depends on continuity among those responsible for its development.
Finally, fragmentation of congressional oversight authority over EPA has
exacerbated Congress's problems in seeking to speak with a coherent and
consistent voice on environmental matters. The appropriations committees
have often resisted the efforts of the authorization committees by declining
(with OMB support) to provide EPA with the level of funding necessary for
even a good faith effort to achieve the statutory mandates. As a result,
increases in EPA's budget have lagged far behind increases in the agency's
statutory responsibilities. 13 6 The appropriations committees have also placed
130. Landy, Roberts & Thomas, Asking the W1rong Questions at 112 (cited in note 56) (congressional
oversight diverted Agency resources from developing RCRA regulations).
131. Feliciano, EPA: An Analysis of Its Controversies at 276 (cited in note 63); Yancy, W1ithholding of
Documents at 110-13 (cited in note 65).
132. Aberbach, JIWatchful Eye at 7 (cited in note 7).
133. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, The
Nations Hazardous JWaste Management Program at a Crossroads 8-9 (EPA, 1990); see generally EPA
Science Advisory Board, Reducing Risk: Setting Priorities and Strategies for Environmental Protection 1 (EPA,
Sept 1990) (blaming "fragmentary nature of US environmental policy," as evidenced by the absence
of consistent and coordinated pollution control laws, as a cause of misplaced priorities).
134. Irene B. Devine, Organizational Crisis and Individual Response: The Case of the Environmental
Protection Agency 71 (unpublished PhD dissertation, Case Western Reserve U, 1983); Steps Toward a
Stable Future 3 (Natl Acad Pub Admin, 1984); see also Wilson, Bureaucracy at 95 (cited in note 74);
Steve Kelman, Making Public Policy-A Hopeful View of American Government 247, 261-62 (Basic Books,
1987).
135. Lazarus, 54 L, & Contemp Probs at 353 (cited in note 101).
136. The congressional appropriations were less under President Carter than under Presidents
Ford or Nixon, and EPA's budget has decreased 12% since 1981. See Regens & Rycroft, 26 Soc SciJ
at 293-94 (cited in note 68); S Rep No 101-262, 101st Cong, 2d Sess 16 (1990): see also Robert V.
Bartless, The Budgetary Process and Environmental Policy, in Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft, eds,
Environmental Policy in the 1980s: Reagan's X\Nv Agenda 138-39 (Cong Q Press, 1984).
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"riders" on appropriations bills that have effectively prevented EPA from
37
taking action otherwise required by the agency's statutory mandate.1
Excessive fragmentation of committee oversight jurisdiction also causes
laws to be poorly drafted and designed. Quite often no single committee is in
an effective position to take a comprehensive, holistic look at a particular
environmental problem. Instead, each committee tends to examine the
problem through its own narrow jurisdictional lens and worries primarily
about the impact of statutory amendment on its own jurisdiction. 138 The
result can be different laws, and even different provisions within the same law,
working at cross purposes.
Indeed, the absence of coordination between all the various committees
with jurisdiction to oversee EPA has often stymied efforts to amend existing
laws. Needed amendments to CERCLA were stalled for this reason; 3 9
amendments to the Clean Air Act took over thirteen years for congressional
4
passage because of similar problems of congressional coordination. 0
Promising ideas such as pollution prevention and cross-media regulation have
been tirelessly promoted, but Congress has enacted relatively little legislation
to further either initiative.' 4 ' Even passage of legislation as seemingly
uncontroversial as that designed to elevate EPA to cabinet status has been
delayed, partly because some committees were concerned about its possible
42
impact on their jurisdiction over the agency's programs.'
137. See Foreman, Signals from the Hill at 105-07 (cited in note 51) (describing examples of
appropriation riders limiting EPA authority); HR Rep 101-490, 101st Cong, 2d Sess 145-46 (1990)
(describing how Congress barred EPA from using appropriated funds to impose sanctions under the
Clean Air Act on certain violators); see also Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies through
Limitation Riders, 1987 Duke LJ 456.
138. Aberbach, Watchful Eye at 33, 198-201 (cited in note 7).
139. Former EPA Administrator Lee Thomas described his "disgust" with the process of
reauthorizing CERCLA in 1986, focusing on the sheer number of committees involved and how
much time was spent "looking for a room big enough to hold everybody." Department of Housing
and Urban Development-Independent Agencies Appropriations for 1987, Hearings before the
Subcommittee on HUD-Independent Agencies of the House Committee on Appropriations, 99th
Cong, 2d Sess 160 (1986).
140. For instance, 132 members of the House were responsible for the negotiations on different
aspects of the Conference Committee's consideration of the 1990 Clean Air Act bill. See Lengthy List
of House Conferees Promises an Unwieldy CAA Conference Most Say, II Inside EPA 13 (July 6, 1990). Some
credit (or blame) Representative John Dingell, who was responsible for the appointment of 132
members to the Conference Committee, for having "singlehandedly blocked revision or
reauthorization of the Clean Air Act [from 1979 to 1990], acting to protect the biggest special
interest in his home town (Detroit), the auto industry." Barnes, 100 Pub Interest at 53 (cited in note
73).
141. Congress did, however, enact a limited pollution prevention bill in the final days of the 101 st
Congress as part of the budget reconciliation package. See Pub L No 101-508, § 6601, 104 Stat 1388
(1990); 136 Cong Rec H12517 (Oct 26, 1990). Congress, however, apparently failed to appropriate
adequate funding for implementation of the bill's provisions. See Budget Limits Affecting EPA's Ability to
Implement New Pollution Prevention Law, 21 Envir Rptr (BNA) 2039 (March 1991).
142. See Mlajority Leader Intervenes to Break Senate Deadlock over EPA Elevation Bill, 11 Inside EPA 3
(June 8, 1990); EPA Cabinet Bill Deadfor this )'ear, Some Fault Administration Inaction, II Inside EPA 3
(Nov 2, 1990). Every, time the legislation conferring cabinet status upon EPA freed itself of one
problem, another emerged, prompting speculation that EPA's cabinet status was itself sufficiently
threatening to vested interests to ensure the legislation's defeat. By the end of 1991, however, just
before this symposium issue went to press, Congress finally passed a version of EPA cabinet
legislation that appeared to be stripped of past controversies, and the House seemed interested in its
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V
POSSIBLE REFORMS FOR IMPROVING CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT OF

EPA

Congress could address in a variety of ways the problems to which its
oversight of EPA has contributed. First, Congress, especially the House,
could reduce fragmentation in oversight authority over EPA by reducing the
number of standing committees and subcommittees with jurisdiction over the
agency. Much of the intensity of present congressional oversight of EPA
appears to be due to the current system, under which closely related (and
sometimes duplicative) hearings are held by different committees and
subcommittees. A second, related reform would be for Congress to establish
mechanisms for improving coordination of congressional oversight among
existing committees. For instance, Congress could establish a formal
oversight agenda that set out a systematic, comprehensive, and long-term
program for the examination of the various environmental laws and their
implementation by EPA. 1 43 Interested committees could join together in a
hearing, but the topic, not a particular committee or subcommittee, would
trigger the hearing pursuant to the pre-established oversight agenda. Ad hoc
hearings that were not part of the formal oversight agenda would be
discouraged.
A related way to improve coordination and weed out unnecessary hearings
would be to require committees and subcommittees to establish their own
oversight agendas and to discuss their plans with other potentially interested
committees. 44 To that same end, each committee or subcommittee could be
required to prepare a formal written justification for an oversight hearing
prior to arranging the hearing itself. Such reports could require descriptions
of the hearing's purpose; its relationship to the committee's jurisdiction and
to the oversight agendas of Congress and the relevant committee or
subcommittee; the committee's efforts to coordinate the hearing with any
other committee with related jurisdiction; the committee's discussion with the
agency about the need for an oversight hearing; and the anticipated cost of
the hearing. The reporting requirement could extend to written statements
following the hearing concerning the steps taken by the committee, if any, to
address the problems identified. Requiring such justifications, without more,
adoption. See 137 Cong Rec S14012-32; Senate Passes EPA Cabinet-Level Bill, Adds Amendment on
Statistics and Confidentiality, 22 Envir Rptr Curr Dev (BNA) 1407 (Oct 4, 1991).
143. NAPA, Oversight Study at 44-46 (cited in note 9).
144. The Senate Committee on Government Operations made two related recommendations in
1977:
To improve coordination of oversight activities the Congress should require that all
committees with responsibility for oversight of regulatory agencies report on their oversight
plans each session. Such reports would be submitted to the Senate Rules Committee or the
House Administration Committee along with each committee's annual budget. ...
The Senate and House should require standing committees to include in their legislative
reports a summary of any oversight findings and recommendations made by other
committees, providing that they are made on a timely basis.
Senate Study on Federal Regulation at 98 (cited in note 8).
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might chill some of the more impulsive, mostly self-aggrandizing, and less
valuable, oversight hearings.
A more ambitious (and therefore controversial) reform would supplement
the procedural reporting requirement with measures intended to make the
standing committee and subcommittee chairs more accountable for their
decisions to convene full oversight hearings. Presently, a standing chair's
authority to convene a hearing is subject only to committee budgetary and
timing limitations,' 4 5 and the possibility that another committee might
complain to the rules committee4 6that the hearing lies outside the first
committee's assigned jurisdiction. 1
One possible. method to promote accountability would be to tie the
committee's future budget requests more closely to the merits of its past
oversight justifications. 4 7 If a standing committee or subcommittee chair
became persuaded that its oversight budget would be adversely affected by
the appearance of impulsive, unnecessary hearings, or the absence of
meaningful follow-through subsequent to a hearing, the chair might exercise
more care when considering the merits of a particular oversight proposal.
A related reform would allocate most oversight funding to systematic
evaluation of agency statutes as prescribed by a formal congressional
oversight agenda, and leave budgetary requests for ad hoc oversight to
applications from a limited amount of remaining funds. The National
Academy of Public Administration recently recommended just such a
145. Examination of the rules of the relevant Senate and House committees did not reveal any
general limitations on a subcommittee chair's authority to convene an oversight hearing, except for
those pertaining to space, timing, and budget. See generally Senate Committee on Rules and
Administration, 101st Cong, 1st Sess, Authority and Rules of the Senate Committees (Comm Print,
1990); House Committee on Rules, 101st Cong, 1st Sess, Rules Adopted by the Committees of the
House of Representatives (Comm Print, 1990). In those circumstances when the subcommittee chair
must seek the standing committee chair's prior permission, those requests are likely granted on a pro
forma basis, particularly if the hearing will occur in Washington, D.C. (and therefore not require
significant expenditures from the standing committee's budget). In isolated instances, of course, the
standing committee chair may advise against the subcommittee hearing-perhaps because the full
committee itself would like to take up the issue-because another congressperson with a constituent
who wishes to avoid the hearing has successfully bent the full committee chair's ear, or simply as a
sanction for an unrelated transgression by the subcommittee chair. Because, however, the current
rules do not appear to limit significantly a subcommittee's ability to convene an oversight hearing,
one possible reform would be to impose some limitations. For instance, a subcommittee might be
required to seek the standing committee chair's approval of an oversight hearing outside the preestablished oversight agenda. Given such authority, the standing committee chair, for instance,
might determine that the hearing was too broad in scope and could be justified only if joined by
other committees with related jurisdiction, or was simply excessive in light of the committee's other
oversight endeavors during the session.
146. Of course, others on the committee may likewise request a committee meeting or hearing on
a particular topic. For instance, the rules for both the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
(Rule 1(b)) and the House Committee on Energy and Commerce (Rule 2(c)), like rules for other
committees, provide that if three members of the committee (or subcommittee) request the chair to
convene a meeting and the chair does not do so within seven days, then the meeting will be held if a
majority of those on the committee support the request.
147. A 1977 Senate Committee recommendation sought to tie in oversight to budget requests by
requiring that each committee include a report on its oversight plans in its budget request. See note
144.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 54: No. 4

reform. 14 8 Under its proposal, certain funds would be set aside for special
oversight projects, and the House and Senate leadership would work with the
committees to establish guidelines for awarding those funds.
Another area for reform would involve somehow bridging the
philosophical gap that has persisted between the authorization committees
responsible for drafting the laws implemented by EPA and the appropriations
committees responsible for determining EPA's budget. The whipsawing of
EPA between these two types of committees might be diminished, or at least
the conflict redirected, by increasing coordination and channels of
communication between them. For instance, those who draft the statutes
within EPA's charge presently appear to make little effort to ensure that the
agency receives the level of funding necessary to do its work. If
representatives on the relevant standing authorization committees testified
more routinely before the appropriations committees concerning the need for
specified levels of agency funding, they might provide an authoritative voice
in favor of funding that is otherwise currently lacking from the budget
process. 14 9 Congress also should reduce its use of appropriations riders that
seek, in effect, to amend the existing law. 1 50 At the very least, such riders
should, as a matter of congressional rule, require referral to the authorization
committee(s) with jurisdiction over the underlying federal statutory
program. 151
Finally, some thoughtful suggestions have been made concerning how to
discourage Congress from imposing unrealistic statutory mandates on EPA.
Mere exhortation for Congress to do better and to be fairer is, unfortunately,
likely to fall on deaf ears. A better approach might be to institutionalize some
procedures that would make those results more likely. One proposal would
require the committee to consider the views of OTA or GAO concerning the
reasonableness of a particular mandate (including the deadline) prior to its
imposition.' 52 Finally, the National Academy of Sciences once suggested the
possibility of allowing EPA to extend deadlines for prescribed time periods in
certain circumstances.

53

1

148. NAPA, Oversight Study at 46 (cited in note 9).
149. EESI, Statutory Deadlines in Environmental Legislation at xii-xiii (cited in note 93).
150. Many have criticized the use of appropriations riders as a matter of policy, and some have
argued that they are unconstitutional. See, for example, Victor M. Sher & Carol Sue Hunting,
Eroding the Laws: Congressional Exemptions from Judicial Review of Environmental Laws, 15 Harv Envir L
Rev 435 (1991); Rabkin, 100 Pub Interest at 126 (cited in note 7). The Ninth Circuit, in fact, recently
held unconstitutional (under separation of powers doctrine) an appropriations rider that limited the
court's jurisdiction to review a particular environmental management decision of the Department of
Agriculture's Forest Service. The Supreme Court has decided to review that decision. See Seattle
Audubon Society v Robertson, 914 F2d 1311 (9th Cir 1990), cert granted, No 90-1596, 59 USLW 3865
(1991).
151. Another possible alternative is for reviewing courts to pay greater heed to appropriations
language when discerning congressional intent.
152. The Congressional Budget Office, however, does currently include an estimate of the cost of
proposed legislation in House and Senate reports on bills that committees report out. See, for
example, S Rep No 101-262, 101st Cong, 2d Sess 58-60 (1990) (report on the Department of the
Environment Act of 1990).
153. Decisionmaking in the EPA at 66-71 (cited in note 97).
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VI
QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE WISDOM, EFFECTIVENESS, AND
POLITICAL FEASIBILITY OF OVERSIGHT REFORM

Serious questions remain concerning whether any of these reforms would
be wise, especially effective, or politically feasible. With regard to the wisdom
of reform, the danger always exists that the cure could be worse than the
disease. Reforms that reduce poor oversight practices might simultaneously
decrease those that have proven most valuable.
It is also exceedingly difficult to distinguish "good" from "bad" oversight.
There are few obvious objective criteria for oversight's evaluation. The
beauty or ugliness of oversight lies largely in the eye of the beholder, with the
answer to an inquiry concerning a particular oversight activity's worth likely
turning on whether the evaluator shares values and preferences similar to
those of the overseer. For this reason, even if we were able to determine what
kind of oversight would be reduced by a particular reform of current
congressional oversight practices, little consensus concerning whether that
reform would constitute a net improvement is likely.
Another potential problem with discouraging congressional oversight is
that it might encourage an increase in detailed legislative prescription.
Authorization committees, in other words, would seek to control the agency
through precise legislation if they were unable to use the leverage of oversight
to influence agency behavior. For the reasons already described,' 54 an
increase in detailed legislative prescription would probably be a step in the
wrong direction in the evolution of federal environmental law.
It is also unclear how effective these reforms would be in redressing the
adverse effects of oversight previously identified.' 55 The reforms principally
concern the kind of formal oversight conducted in agency hearings. Less
formal oversight, however, may also contribute to EPA's problems. In
addition, congressional oversight is hardly the sole cause of many of these
problems; EPA's predicament is a product of a continuing clash of
institutional forces. For this reason, restricting one factor in the equation may
be a necessary but not a sufficient remedial measure. Indeed, the
disequilibrium created by such a unilateral decrease of one factor could create
new problems. For instance, Congress's current oversight excesses are partly
in response to the excesses displayed by OMB;15 6 restricting the former
without limiting the latter would enhance OMB's power considerably.
Finally, there is even greater reason to question the political feasibility of
any of these reforms. It seems virtually impossible to prompt Congress to
adopt even the more modest proposals, let alone to persuade legislators to
cease assigning impossible tasks to EPA. The EPA administrators have long
complained about the phenomena of congressional oversight and sought to
154.
155.
156.

See text accompanying notes 125-126.
See text accompanying notes 122-142.
See text accompanying notes 56, 114.
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reduce the number of committee overseers. 15 7 In addition, the National
Academy of Sciences reported twenty years ago that congressional
reorganization was a prerequisite to effective federal governmental
management of the environment. 58 The Academy has likewise
recommended that Congress take measures to avoid imposing unreasonable
deadlines on the agency. 1 59 The Administrative Conference echoes these
sentiments. '-0
At most, however, Congress has made only minimal efforts to improve the
situation by restructuring committee jurisdiction, reforming oversight
practices, or taking more care in imposing deadlines. In the early 1970s,
Congress failed to follow through on a fairly modest proposal to create a joint
committee on the environment. 16 ' Efforts in the mid-1970s to restructure
committee jurisdiction were only somewhat successful in diminishing the
fragmentation of authority over environmental matters. The Senate achieved
substantial consolidation with its creation of the Senate Committee on the
Environment and Public Works in the mid-1970s,' 62 but the House defeated a
parallel effort.' 63 Probably for this reason, although fragmentation in terms
of the sheer number of committees and subcommittees persists in both
chambers (and likely cannot be entirely avoided), 164 the problems presented
by fragmentation in the House have proven substantially greater than those in
the Senate.
Whatever its disadvantages, however, members of Congress do not appear
to have sufficient incentives to change the existing system.' 6 5 The aspects of
legislative oversight that are problematic are the same ones that make reform
less likely. Decentralization, fragmentation of committee authority, and the
157. See Congress and the Nation's Environment, Environmental and Natural Resources Affairs
of the 92nd Congress, Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong, 1st Sess 845
(1973); Peggy Wiehl, Ruckelshaus and EPA: Case Program-JohnF. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University 13 (Harvard U Press, 1974); Douglas Costle, A Regulator's Path Isn't a Rose Garden, NY Times
E21 (April 24, 1983); Reilly, The Turning Point at 9 (cited in note 34).
158. See Institutions for Effective Management of the Environment, Report of the Environmental
Study Group to the Environmental Studies Board of the National Academy of Sciences and National
Academy of Engineering Pt 1, 52 (Natl Acad Sciences, 1970).
159. See text accompanying note 153.
160. See Edward Tomlinson, Report on the Experience of Various Agencies with Statutory Limits Applicable
to Licensing or ClearanceFunctions and to Rulemaking, in Administrative Conference of the United States,
Re'ommendations and Reports 122 (1978).
161. See Environmental Policy Division, Congressional Research Service of the Library of
Congress, Congress and the Nation's Environment, Environmental and Natural Resources Affairs of
the 93rd Congress, Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 98th Cong, 1st Sess 833-36
(1983); see also Report of the Council on Environmental Quality, Hearings before the Subcommittee
on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Committee on Public Works, 91st Cong, 2d Sess 2 (1970)
(statement of Sen. Muskie).
162. Dodd & Schott, Congress and the Administrative State at 186-88 (cited in note 18); History of the
Senate Committee at 14-18 (cited in note 48).
163. See Henry C. Kenski & Margaret Corgan Kenski, Congress against the President: The Struggle
Over the Environment, in Vig & Kraft, eds, Reagan's New Agenda at 110 (cited in note 91); see also NAPA,
Oversight Study at 15-16 (cited in note 9).
164. Because the impact of environmental laws is so sweeping, some fragmentation is
unavoidable.
165. Dodd & Schott, Congress and the Administrative State at 273, 326 (cited in note 18).
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absence of checks on oversight all empower individual legislators by
providing them with leverage over an agency that can enhance their reelection
prospects and national prestige.' 6 6 Elected representatives naturally prefer
high visibility committees with jurisdiction over pressing national issues like
environmental protection. 167 They are therefore likely to resist, as they have
inthe past,' 68 any reforms that rely on reduced subcommittee jurisdiction and
the centralization of authority,
Congress has never displayed a predilection to regulate itself.' 69 Very
little effective oversight of legislative appropriations exists, which is one
reason why the number of congressional staff has grown exponentially in
recent years. No effective authority is positioned to second-guess the wisdom
of such an expansion. Likewise, there is relatively little effort to circumscribe
the authority of the subcommittee chairs. The absence of restrictions on
congressional oversight simply reflects Congress's general reluctance to
regulate itself.
VII
CONCLUSION

The adverse effects of congressional oversight appear to be substantial.
But do they mean that congressional oversight should be eliminated?
Absolutely not. The practical advantages of oversight are too numerous, and
its importance to our system of government is too central. Congressional
oversight is, after all, Congress's most effective way to curb abuses by another
branch of government and is also necessary for Congress's development of
166. NAPA, Oversight Study at 12 (cited in note 9); Dodd & Schott, Congress and the Administrative
State at 273, 326 (cited in note 18). For instance, representatives and senators routinely threaten to
affect an agency's programs adversely (for example, cutting appropriations or delaying confirmation
of its appointees) unless the agency agrees to respond to a problem within the member's district (or
state). EPA, like other agencies, frequently has little practical choice. It must choose the path of least
resistance and attempt to placate the legislator's parochial concerns. Aberbach, Watchful Eye at 7
(cited in note 7). Even an agency's failure to consult with an interested subcommittee prior to
making a decision may trigger severe congressional retribution. See Thomas Watson, Panel Cuts
Budget in Showdown with Justice Department, 8.5 Legal Times of Washington 17 (June 25, 1990)
(recommending 10% budget cut in Office of Legal Counsel because it issued an opinion without
prior opportunity for review by House subcommittee). See, for example, EPA NVominees Break Freefrom
Hold by Senator Concerned about Superfund Site, 10 Inside EPA 4-5 (Nov 24, 1989) (Senator Metzenbaum
placed "hold" on two nominees to assistant administrator positions at EPA until Administrator Reilly
satisfied him that EPA would rectify specific problem at a Superfund site in Ohio, the senator's home
state).

167. See Barbara Sinclair, The Distribution of Committee Positions in the United States Senate: Explaining
Institutional Change, 32 Am J Pol Sci 276, 297 (1988); see also Charles S. Bullock, III, United States
Senate Committee Assignments: Preference, Motivation, and Success, 29 Am J Pol Sci 789 (1985).
168. Aberbach notes that
the more a reform opens the possibility of centralized control of the oversight agenda and
the more comprehensive the reviews it encourages-reviews cutting across committee
jurisdictions and increasing the vulnerability of programs to actions by those outside the
committees-the more resistance it is likely to meet in Congress.
Aberbach, [latchfl Eve at 207 (cited in note 7).
169. Congress' longstanding refusal to extend fully the protection of the nondiscrimination
provisions of the Civil Rights Act to its own staff is a stark example.
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legislation. 170 The adverse effects on EPA and on the fashioning and
implementation of federal environmental law also do not support singling out
environmental law for drastic reductions in congressional oversight. Though
the adverse effects are substantial, they do not appear to be greater than the
associated benefits. The federal environmental statutes and EPA have made
significant achievements during the last twenty years. Substantial
improvements in environmental quality have been made in some areas and at
least a resistance to more environmental degradation has emerged in many
other areas, despite a growing level of industrial activity.' 7 ' Congressional
oversight has played an instrumental role in many of those accomplishments.
The substantial adverse effects on EPA of congressional oversight
nonetheless strongly suggest that reformation of the oversight process is
warranted. The problems are not unique to EPA, but they appear there to
have been realized to an unprecedented extent. Even more importantly, EPA
can ill afford such problems.
There is a growing consensus that future environmental protection efforts
72
will need to do more than merely continue past regulatory regimes.'
Priorities need to be shifted, and new approaches to environmental control
will be required. Whatever their precise identity, the tasks will require a
strong and invigorated EPA. An important lesson of the last twenty years,
however, is that the existing fragmented, uncoordinated, and undisciplined
regime of congressional oversight has been a substantial impediment to the
kind of paradigmatic shifts in approach and institutional structures that
appear now to be necessary.
To be sure, there is reason to be concerned that oversight reform might
unintentionally eliminate some oversight that would have proven valuable.
Some loss is unavoidable. However, it seems unlikely that the costs in terms
of lost oversight would be greater than the benefits of reform. Under the
current system, there is virtually no meaningful check on congressional
oversight. The question of how much accountability is warranted can be
debated. But it seems fairly certain that significantly more accountability than
is presently provided could be added with little risk of it being so excessive as
to chill the good along with the bad. In the long run, fundamental change will
no doubt occur only upon bridging the current gap that persists between
public aspirations for environmental protection and public willingness to
make the changes necessary for those aspirations to be realized. In the
170. See Watkins v United States, 354 US 178, 187 (1957) ("The power of the Congress to conduct
investigations is inherent in the legislative process.").
171. See Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality-Twentieth Annual Report 7-11
(U.S. Govt Printing Office, 1990).
172. See, for example, the statement by the EPA advisory board:
IT]his kind of fragmented approach to protecting the environment will not be as successful
in the fiture as it has been in the past.... Given the diversity, complexity, and scope of the
environmental problems of concern today, it is critically important that U.S. environmental
policy evolves in several fundamental ways.
EPA Science Advisory Board, Reducing Risk at I (cited in note 133); see also Arnold W. Reitze, Jr.,
Environmental Polic--1t Is Timefor a New Beginning, 15 Colum J Envir L 111 (1989).
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meantime, however, Congress, like the other branches of government, could
facilitate that result by improving its own decisionmaking through the use of
procedures designed to reduce impulsiveness and promote reasoned
contemplation. That should hardly seem a controversial proposition.
Nonetheless, it is probably foolhardy to believe that Congress will soon
reform its oversight practices. Indeed, such a call for congressional reform
may be as unrealistic as many of the mandates included by Congress in some
of its early environmental statutes. The thesis of this paper is not, however,
that Congress will, in fact, initiate reform any time soon. It is rather that an
appreciation of the effects of congressional oversight on EPA and on the
development of federal environmental law over the last two decades suggests
that Congress should.

